NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 87
Number 6 North Carolina Issue

Article 2

9-1-2009

North Carolina Common Law Parol Evidence
Rule
Caroline N. Brown

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Caroline N. Brown, North Carolina Common Law Parol Evidence Rule, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1699 (2009).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol87/iss6/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA COMMON LAW PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE*
CAROLINE N. BROWN"

This Article evaluates the application of the parol evidence rule
by the courts in North Carolina. The Article explores the
tortured and murky history of the rule, to which many of the
difficulties associated with its application are surely attributable.
Although the North Carolina courts do a fine job with certain
groups of cases, including those with merger clauses, this Article
points out the continuation and exacerbation of an earlier
tendency to avoid real analysis by citing and quoting fragments
of the parol evidence rule seemingly at random. Especially
alarming is the obvious omission of serious inquiry into the
parties' intention to make a final writing. Because it is subsumed
within the issue of completeness by the courts, there is a strong
likelihood thatfinality will be assumed or presumed by the courts
even in cases where the writing is informal and rudimentary. The
liberal tendency marked by prior commentators to admit
extrinsic evidence that is credible and not contradictory is still
observable, but it is now challenged by a line of cases that applies
a stringent "four corners" test. The unpredictable and chaotic
state of the parol evidence rule in North Carolinaposes a serious
enough threat to most contracts to warrant intervention and
explication of the rule by the state supreme court.
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INTRODUCTION

The thrust of the parol evidence rule ("PER") is to make written
terms effective as the terms of a contract as a matter of law. That
sounds like a relatively simple and unobjectionable function. In
reality, the rule has so eluded reason as to inspire a whole catalog of
dark metaphor and phantasmagorical description for which it is
famous.' Such is its associated uncertainty and confusion that Eric
Posner recently observed that "[i]n virtually every jurisdiction, one
finds ... cries of despair." 2 Despite the odds, much has been written
in an attempt to bring a measure of predictability and uniformity to
the case law. Such efforts might have been more successful but for a
fundamental split between the two greatest authorities of the past
century, Samuel Williston and Arthur L. Corbin.3 The fervency of
their disagreement about the PER diluted whatever potential their
work might otherwise have had in clarifying the law; arguably it
merely fed the prevalent confusion and hysteria, resulting in a kind of

1. Much of this is gathered in Part I, although some is scattered throughout this
Article. By no means is all of it captured here. See infra Part I.
2. Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 540 (1998). The
observation is all the more poignant coming from a careful law and economics scholar of
the Chicago School.
3. See 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 573-96 (1960); 2
SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 601-47 (1924).
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judicial hopelessness. So great has been their influence that it is
nearly impossible to talk about what the courts do with the PER
without characterizing it by reference to Williston or Corbin.
In North Carolina, the exploration of the PER was conducted by
giants in the law. In 1932, a seminal article4 was co-authored by Dean
Charles T. McCormick' and James H. Chadbourn,6 who was then
editor-in-chief of the North Carolina Law Review. In 1955, John P.
Dalzell brought their work up to date in a second piece. 7 Their work
provides a secure foundation for this Article. Because the subject is
timeless, the recommendations of these luminaries remain sterling
even after so many years, and it is with a heightened sense of
responsibility to their legacy and to the practitioners and judges of
this state who have benefited from it that this reassessment of the rule
is undertaken.
Part I of this Article demonstrates the confusion and complexity
of the PER. Its origins are examined, highlighting an irrational
mystical belief in the talismanic quality of the written word that has
little to do with real transactions.
Part II provides a simple
Discussion Model to serve as a convenient point of reference, so that
the reader may follow the discussion in the outline of the rule. The
very heated controversy between Corbin and Williston is described in
Part III. These preliminary parts of this Article provide important
background for Part IV, which explicates the case law in North
Carolina. Part IV has a number of divisions, which either mirror or
extend the organization of the rule shown in the Discussion Model of
Part II and are typical of most, if not all, PERs. The issue of finality is
emphasized and the application of a poorly crafted presumption of
finality and completeness is criticized. Because the law pertaining to
interpretation has influenced PER analysis in North Carolina,
attention is given to an array of tests for ambiguity. Part V
undertakes a more sophisticated look at the rule, pulling together the
prior text and offering some suggestions for practice in North
Carolina and in other states with similar rules. The conclusion begs
the courts to avoid the great potential for harm that the PER
4. James H. Chadbourn & Charles T. McCormick, The ParolEvidence Rule in North
Carolina,9 N.C. L. REV. 151 (1931).
5. McCormick had moved from Texas to join the law faculty at the University of

North Carolina in 1926, rising to the deanship a year later. Eventually, after succeeding
Wigmore at Northwestern at the latter's request, he was to become dean at Texas.
6. Chadbourn became a celebrated member of the Harvard Law faculty.
7. John P. Dalzell, Twenty-Five Years of Parol Evidence in North Carolina, 33 N.C.

L. REV. 420 (1955). Like McCormick, Dalzell was a faculty member at the University of
North Carolina School of Law.
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threatens, urging them to fashion a coherent rule with more
predictable and humane results.
I. INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNINGS

A.

The North CarolinaParolEvidence Rule in Brief Then and Now
In 1932, by comparison to a benchmark rule they extrapolated
from Wigmore,8 Chadbourn and McCormick concluded with regret
that North Carolina had "abrogated the parol evidence rule for most
purposes." 9 Generalizing from their study, Corbin concluded that
most other states were just as liberal and just as confused as the Old
North State." In 1955, Dalzell confirmed the continuation of this
pattern, suggesting that North Carolina's rule might actually go
beyond the liberality of Corbin's or Wigmore's in admitting extrinsic
evidence of contract terms:
[North Carolina's] parol evidence rule is certainly not the rule
supported by Williston, and in some decisions it seems to afford
the written contract even less protection than does the rule
stated by Corbin and Wigmore. As pointed out in the earlier
article, there is a tendency in North Carolina when parol
evidence is offered as affecting a written contract without a
merger clause, to handle it in two questions, one for the court,
the other for the jury. First, the court would decide whether
there was any necessary contradiction between the parol
evidence and the writing, such total inconsistency as would
make co-existence of the written agreement and the oral
agreement impossible. If no contradiction were found, the jury
is left to say whether the alleged oral agreement was made; if
so, it is enforced. For if the oral agreement was made, it is

8. The version of the rule Chadbourn and McCormick extrapolated from Wigmore
is: "Any or all parts of a transactionprior to or contemporaneous with a writing intended to
record them finally are superseded and made legally ineffective by the writing." Chadbourn
& McCormick, supra note 4, at 152 (citing 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2400 (2d
ed. 1923)). A comparison to the Discussion Model included below in this Article will
reveal differences that would make Wigmore's version an unlikely choice today. See infra
Part II. The modern rule's focus on the exclusion of terms, rather than "parts of a
transaction," is most crucial. The omission in Wigmore's version of any explicit reference
to completeness is striking, although the words "record them" may be an indirect
reference to it. The Wigmore version also differs from this Article's Discussion Model in
excluding contemporaneous writings, which this author regards generally as part of the
writing protected by the PER. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
9. Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at 156.
10. Dalzell, supra note 7, at 420 n.1 (citing 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 265 n.76).
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concluded that the writing was incomplete, a partial integration
only. II
More than fifty years later, change has finally come;
unfortunately, it is not for the better. Today, the North Carolina
PER defies characterization as liberal or conservative, having
deteriorated to a state of chaotic unpredictability. In this, the state is
by no means alone, most states having been described recently as
"consistently erratic."' 2 In fact, "[s]uch is the confusion that in any
state a decision may be reached which is ludicrous in result and
analysis, or sensible in result but strained in analysis. ' 13 It may be
that the cases are unprincipled because the rule of law itself is obscure
and difficult out of all proportion to the benefits it yields. A related
possibility is that the reduction of class hours devoted to the study of
contract law has reduced students' mastery of the PER, leaving
counsel unable to disentangle the rule's complexities.
Whatever the cause, the prevailing methodology seems to gather
fragments of the rule from randomly selected cases and toss them
randomly into the text of a decision. Words and phrases gleaned
from prior cases are quoted, often in clusters, without apparent
regard for consistency in the precedent relied upon or for the
articulation of a coherent rule. Rarely does any analysis follow the
selected quotations or, if there is any, it tends to be conclusory. Such
practice defies rational analysis. Reduced to unconnected words
without historical or doctrinal context, the words and phrases of the
fragmentary North Carolina PER may be recounted and assessed for
their import, but the use of these PER fragments by the courts cannot
be organized into a systematic account of the rule. 4 The current
methodology gives prophetic significance to Thayer's 1898 complaint
that as to the PER, "there is a grouping together of a mass of
incongruous matter, and then it is looked at in a wrong focus."' 5
11. Id. at 428 (footnote omitted) (citing Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at
157).
12. See Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol
Evidence Rule. 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 807 (2002) (quoting John D. Calamari &
Joseph M. Perillo, A Plea For a Uniform ParolEvidence Rule and Principles of Contract
Interpretation,42 IND. L.J. 333, 343-44 (1967) (citations omitted)).

13. Id.
14. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing the application of the PER in North Carolina
cases).
15. Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at 151 (quoting JAMES BRADLEY
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 390 (Boston,
Little, Brown, and Co. 1898) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thayer was speaking
not of a general failure of PER methodology as is described in this Article, but of the
relatively minor error of assigning the rule to the law of evidence rather than to the
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Such a rule defies characterization: it is neither consistently
liberal nor conservative. No longer can anyone count on North
Carolina courts to champion the admission of credible extrinsic
evidence, as they used to do. Nor, on the other hand, is the rule a
dependable exclusionary tool; although there is certainly a line of
cases running counter to the old liberalism, exhibiting an implacable
determination to maintain inviolate the sanctity of the writing, it is
not applied with consistency. Nor can the rule claim a middle-of-theroad status given the wild swings in the case law from one extreme to
the other. What is fair to say is simply that, despite the most
determined effort, no useful generalization has been found for what
North Carolina courts are doing or will do next with the PER.
There is, however, a robust exception observable in two groups
of cases where the general fragmentary methodology gives way to a
satisfyingly nuanced and principled analysis. 6 In one group, the PER
analysis is informed, shaped, and given meaning by an external factor,
Cases involving restrictive
such as a recordation requirement.
covenants exemplify this group, with the courts applying the PER
conservatively, justified by policy concerns and conventional risk
allocation. The second group of cases has in common the judicial
expertise that comes from frequent litigation. For example, North
Carolina courts approach controversy over the terms of consent
decrees and insurance contracts in strikingly different ways that seem
well attuned to the details of underlying policy, bargaining context,
language, syntax, and precedent, paying close attention to the nature
of the process that typically leads to such written agreements. Both
these groups reveal the courts' confident awareness of the practical
significance of what is included in the writing and what is not. A
knowledgeable attorney has a good chance of predicting what the
court will do with the PER in these cases.
B.

A Murky History

Almost the only thing universally agreed upon about the PER is
its notorious difficulty and complexity. As Thayer famously said of it,
"[f]ew things are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties." 7
The rule has yielded little but "fog and mystery." 8 McCormick went
substantive law of contract. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 390 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1898).
16. See infra Part IV.A.
17. THAYER, supra note 15, at 390.
18. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, A Plea For a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule
and Principlesof ContractInterpretation,42 IND. L.J. 333, 333 (1967).
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even further than Thayer: there is no agreement about the rule
among courts and commentators beyond the most superficial level. 19
There is no single version for which there is a sufficient consensus
even to build a discussion in North Carolina, much less nationwide. 0
Rather than resolving disagreement, discussion seems to proliferate
it. Even the rule's name is misleading, confusing generations of law
students. 1
Nevertheless, the name remains unchanged despite Thayer's and
Wigmore's having demonstrated once and for all, more than a
century ago, that the PER is not a rule of evidence at all, but a
substantive rule of contract law. 2 Although it does have the effect of
excluding evidence, the PER does so by substantively limiting the
terms of an agreement to those in the formal writing.23 A term agreed
to earlier is inadmissible only because it has been superseded by the
writing as a matter of law. Not surprisingly, the decree of the great
commentators denying the PER's legitimacy as a rule of evidence was
not accepted universally or instantaneously.
The scholarly
community embraced the change. Secondary authorities, given great
deference by the North Carolina courts, have long agreed that the
PER is not a rule of evidence, but of substantive contract law. These

19. See Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at 151. Disagreement extends to the

PER's scope (does it cover interpretation?), basic content (what proves completeness and
why is it called total integration?), and rationale (credibility? sacredness of writing? fear of
juries? superseded terms?), as well as many more detailed particulars.
20. See Ralph James Mooney, A Friendly Letter to the Oregon Supreme Court: Let's
Try Again on the Parol Evidence Rule, 84 OR. L. REV. 369, 372 (2005) (stating that there is

no clear definition of the rule, nor standards for resolving any issues the rule might raise).
Chadbourn and McCormick had to simplify the Wigmore rule by teasing away all
peripheral issues in order to use it as a model for discussion. See Chadbourn &
McCormick, supra note 4, at 152.
21. "Parol" is a misnomer to the extent it suggests the rule excludes only oral terms.
Whether the rule is one of "evidence" is discussed immediately below. See infra notes 2237 and accompanying text. Peter Linzer introduced the rule as "Neither Holy Nor
Roman." Linzer, supra note 12, at 799. He explained, "[i]n fact, like that political
anachronism, the Holy Roman Empire, the parol evidence rule fits none of the words in
its name: it is not limited to parol-that is, oral-testimony, it is not evidentiary, and it is
not really a rule." Id. at 802.
22. THAYER, supra note 15, at 390-483. Thayer referred to the rule as the "so-called
'Parol Evidence Rule.' " Id. at 410. Chadbourn and McCormick noted with approval that
"Thayer and Wigmore have shown convincingly that, despite the popular notion, it is not a
rule of evidence based on a supposed superior probative force of written over unwritten
evidence. It is rather a rule of substantive law defining what facts are legally effective
when there is a writing." Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at 152 (citing THAYER,
supranote 15, at 390; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2400).
23. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 18, at 334.

1706

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

include all editions of Wigmore, Williston, and Corbin.24 The
Uniform, Federal, and North Carolina Rules of Evidence all have
omitted the PER from their coverage.2 5 Also strongly rejecting the
evidentiary connection are a number of secondary North Carolina
authorities customarily relied on by the state supreme court in its
opinions on issues of evidence and contract law.26 When evidence
texts have included short discussions of the PER, they have done so
grudgingly and as a concession to tradition, abandoning the rule
altogether in the context of the interpretation of writings, where the
complexity of the issue makes the task not worth the effort. One
author universally and reverently relied on in North Carolina
evidentiary cases chided the court, cautioning that it "cannot make a
rule of evidence out of something that is not. It can only mean that
here is one proposition of substantive law that must be taken
advantage of in an unusual manner. 2 7 Evidence scholars have shown
relief in being rid of the PER28 and the most recent edition of Brandis
and Broun on North CarolinaEvidence omits it altogether.29
However, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has been
reluctant toabandon its historic insistence that the rule belongs to the
law of evidence.3" For a while, the poor rule seemed doomed to
homelessness. When the high court stopped insisting that the PER
was a rule of evidence, it still avoided conceding the question
outright. Instead, the court equivocated, calling the rule "a well
established rule of evidence and of substantive law"3 and then
24. See, e.g., 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 573; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2400; 11
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 33:3 (4th ed. 1999).
25. 2 KENNETH S. BROUN, BRANDIS & BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE
§ 258, at 227 n.3 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter BRANDIS & BROUN].
26. 2 HENRY BRANDIS, JR., BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 573 (3d
ed. 1988); 2 HENRY BRANDIS, JR., STANSBURY'S NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 251
(Brandis rev. 1973) [hereinafter STANSBURY].
27. 2 STANSBURY, supra note 26, § 261.
28. Modern evidence scholars are glad to be able to turn their backs on the PER, if
the comments of Kenneth S. Broun and the late Henry Brandis in conversation with the
author are typical. See E-mail from Kenneth S. Broun, Henry Brandis Professor of Law,
University of North Carolina School of Law, to Caroline N. Brown, Professor of Law,
University of North Carolina School of Law (Apr. 15, 2009, 16:50:19 EST) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). Evidence texts have finally begun to omit the PER from
coverage.
29. 1 BRANDIS & BROUN, supra note 25, at xxi.
30. See Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at 152 n.4 ("In North Carolina the
rule is treated as one of evidence.").
31. Bost v. Bost, 234 N.C. 554, 557, 67 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1951); see also Williams v.
McLean, 220 N.C. 504, 506, 17 S.E.2d 644, 645 (1941) (describing the PER as a rule of
substantive law as well as of evidence).
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insisting that it was "unnecessary to choose."32 Fortunately, the court
of appeals took up the tacit invitation and has clearly recognized the
PER as a substantive rule of contract law.33 Having ignored many
opportunities to nudge the lower court back into its old position, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has been sending tacit signals of
acquiescence by pointing (correctly) to irrelevance as the basis for
refusing to admit extrinsic evidence under the PER.34
Thus, haltingly, the PER has crept into a corner of its own near
the foundation of contracts, where it belongs. It might be supposed
that the move from evidence has helped to clarify the rule, but such a
supposition would be mistaken. This contracts rule that purports to
give effect to parties' intentions without any effort to ascertain what
they are provokes as much wariness in its new place as it ever had in
the old.35
Thus, Wigmore's deprecation of it as the "most
discouraging subject in the whole field" 36 of evidence is matched by
Judge Dyer's uncomplimentary metaphor of "a treacherous bog in
the field of contract law."37
Despite its classification having only recently been settled, the
PER is no youngster. It is an Old One born of a "primitive formalism
which attached a mystical and ceremonial effectiveness to the carta

32. Hoots v. Calaway, 282 N.C. 477, 486. 193 S.E.2d 709. 715 (1973); see also E. Steel
Prods. Corp. v. Chestnutt, 252 N.C. 269, 275, 114 S.E.2d 587, 593 (1960) (noting the court
was not concerned whether the PER was a rule of evidence or a rule of contract law).
33. See Ace, Inc. v. Maynard, 108 N.C. App. 241, 248, 423 S.E.2d 504, 508 (1992)
("The parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence but one of substantive law, which, when
coupled with a proper objection, renders legally ineffective the prior oral contradictory
statements." (citing 2 BRANDIS, supra note 26, § 251)).
Although the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) PER was at issue in the case, the statement is a general one, as
the reliance on Brandis would indicate. See id. at 247-48, 423 S.E.2d at 508-09; see also
Hinshaw v. Wright, 105 N.C. App. 158, 164, 412 S.E.2d 138, 142 (1992) ("The parol
evidence rule is not a rule of evidence but of substantive law."); Lindsay v. N.C. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.C. App. 432, 436, 405 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1991) (stating the parol
evidence rule is a rule of substantive law and not of evidence).
34. See Neal v. Marrone, 239 N.C. 73, 78, 79 S.E.2d 239, 242 (1953).
35. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 20, at 370 n.3 ("The rule is a 'maze of conflicting
tests, subrules, and exceptions adversely affecting both the counseling of clients and the
litigation process.' " (quoting Justin Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence:
Diagnosisand Treatment of a Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1968))).
36. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at 235-36. Thayer quoted John Pitt Taylor's treatise,
calling it "perhaps, the most difficult branch of the law of evidence." THAYER. supra note
15, at 390 (quoting JOHN PITT TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND § 1128 (Boston, Boston Book Co. 9th ed.
1897)).
37. Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir. 1971).
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and the seal." 38 McCormick called it a "mysterious legal ban"39 in the
Yale Law Journal,going on to elaborate:
[C]onvenient as this dark and tortuous ritualism was in enabling
the trial judge to retain control over issues not safe to be trusted
to the jury, yet the veiled inconsistencies and irrational
mysticism of this protective phraseology which is draped
around the written document began to impart a sense of
uneasiness .... ."
Some hold that the King's Bench created the PER in The
Countess of Rutland's Case,4 while others insist it was Sir Edward
Coke's own fabrication in his report of the case.42 The rule ascribes a
38. Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for
Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365, 369 n.8 (1932) (quoting 5 WIGMORE, supra note 8.

§ 2426). With Wigmore, McCormick also credited Thayer for the origins of the PER. Id.
Thayer defines "carta" as a formal document required by law in a transaction, signifying
"more than written evidence." THAYER, supra note 15, at 395. McCormick explained,
the writer merely ventures to submit that this formalism, abandoned
elsewhere in so many areas of modern law, had here a special survival
value-the escape from the jury-which led the judges to retain for
writings the conception that they had a sort of magical effect of erasing
all prior oral agreements.
McCormick, supra, at 369 n.8. It has been said that "Bards claim[ed] that crystals and
other stones can hold words within them, and thus are aids to the memory," SUSAN
FRASER KING, LADY MACBETH 53 (2008), but the author has been unable to find an
authoritative source for the assertion. The legend brings to mind Oliver Wendell Holmes'
famous insistence that "a word is not a crystal," deploring the legal tendency to give words
the talismanic effect formerly given crystals, to ensure order and veracity. For further
discussion of Holmes' quote, see infra note 356 and accompanying text.
39. McCormick, supra note 38, at 369.
40. Id. at 372.
41. (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 89 (K.B.).
42. The Countess of Rutland's Case is discussed at length in Hila Keren, Textual
Harassment: A New Historicist Reappraisalof the Parol Evidence Rule with Gender in

Mind, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 251 passim (2005). Keren observes that
"[cjontracting parties were presumed to have understood the cannons [sic] of construction
when drafting their contracts." Id. at 264 n.47 (citing H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885, 899-900 (1985)).

Keren's

recounting of the tale is cited by Juanda Lowder Daniel as grounds for the assertion that
"some scholars believe that the case reporter for that case, Sir Edward Coke, should be
credited with developing the rule as opposed to the Judges of the King's Bench." Juanda
Lowder Daniel, K.I.S.S. the Parol Evidence Rule Goodbye: Simplifying the Concept of
Protectingthe Parties' Written Agreement, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 227. 233 (2007).
Coke reports Popham, C. J., as saying, in the Countess of Rutland's case: "Also it

would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on
consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the
parties, should be controlled by averment of the parties. to be proved by the
uncertain testimony of slippery memory."
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talismanic virtue to the written word, purporting through a sort of
alchemy or necromancy to draw the single true intention from the
word's essential nature or through an exercise of divination by the
court. McCormick describes the words often used by North Carolina
courts in applying the rule,43 saying the "phrase becomes a shibboleth,
repeated in ten thousand cases."' His criticism was not aimed at the
particular words so much as at the methodology by which the PER is
applied. North Carolina cases, then as now, read much like a catalog
of verbal charms, as if the act of recitation itself "enables the judge to
head off the difficulty at its source, not by professing to decide any
question as to the credibility of the asserted oral variation, but by
professing to exclude the evidence from the jury altogether because
forbidden by a mysterious legal ban."45
The case that is perhaps the oldest in the state to apply the PER,
Smith v. Williams,46 involved the sale of a slave. The judge expressed
his belief that "there can be no doubt that the rule is as ancient as any
in the law of evidence, and that it existed before the necessity of
reducing any act into writing was introduced."47
The writing
provided:
Know all men by these presents, that I, Obed Williams, of the
county of Onslow, and State of North-Carolina, have bargained
and sold unto David Smith, of the aforesaid county and State,
one negro fellow, named George, about thirty years of age, for
and in consideration of three hundred dollars. I do warrant and
defend the said negro against the lawful claim or claims of any
McCormick, supra note 38, at 367 n.3 (quoting Countess of Rutland's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.

at 90).
43. McCormick, supra note 38, at 369 ("Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary.
contradict, or add to the terms of a written instrument.") (internal quotation marks
omitted). Identical or virtually identical tests are found in Century Commc'n, Inc. v.
Housing Auth., 313 N.C. 143, 146,326 S.E.2d 261, 264 (1985) (holding extrinsic evidence is
not permitted to "add to, detract from, or vary" the terms of an integrated writing): Rowe
v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 185, 287 S.E.2d 840, 845 (1982) (citing 2 STANSBURY, supra note
26, § 251) (consent divorce order); Hoots v. Calaway, 282 N.C. 477, 486, 193 S.E.2d 709,
715 (1973); Godfrey v. Res-Care, Inc., 165 N.C. App. 68, 76, 598 S.E.2d 396, 402 (2004)
(stating that the PER prohibits evidence of prior oral agreements "to vary, add to, or
contradict [the terms of] a written instrument intended to be the final integration of the
transaction" (quoting Hall v. Hotel L'Europe, Inc. 69 N.C. App. 664, 666, 318 S.E.2d 99,
101 (1984))): Thompson v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 151 N.C. App. 704, 709, 567
S.E.2d 184, 189 (2002).
44. McCormick, supra note 38, at 369.
45. Id.; see also Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at 154 (disapproving three
methods for the court to determine whether the PER applies). For a discussion of cases
implementing McCormick's characterization of the PER, see supra note 43.
46. 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 426 (1810).
47. Id. at 432.
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person or persons whomsoever, unto him the said Smith, his
heirs and assigns forever. Given under my hand this 29th
January, 1802.
OBED WILLIAMS.
Teste, GEORGE ROAN48
Contending that the contract's oral terms were entitled to the
same treatment as those in the writing, the plaintiff pointed out that
"contracts by our law are distinguished by specialty [i.e., sealed
writings] and by parol; that there is no third kind, and that whatever is
not a specialty, though it be in writing, is by parol."4 9 Because the
writing was not sealed, and thus not entitled to the high status given a
"specialty," the plaintiff saw no barrier to his proving that defendant
had made an oral warranty giving assurance that the slave was
healthy, when in fact he was "afflicted with a rupture."5 A witness
had overheard the oral warranty made at the time of the transaction,
so that there was no issue of its credibility; nor was a writing required
by other law as a formality.5' Thus, the court was faced with the
discrete issue whether to give special legal significance to an unsealed
writing that, according to the law of the time, was no more than mere
evidence of the contract it recited. 2 The court rejected the oral
warranty, citing The Countess of Rutland's Case. Having "resolved
that it was very inconvenient that matters in writing should be
controlled by averment of parties, to be proved by uncertain

48. Id. at 426.
49. Id. at 429.
50. Id. at 426.
51. Id. at 431-32. ("By the Common Law of England, there were but few contracts
necessary to be made in writing. Property lying in grant, as rights and future interests, and
that sort of real property, to which the term incorporeal hereditament applies, must have
been authenticated by deed. So the law remained until the stat. 32 H. 8, which, permitting
a partial disposition of land by will, required the will to be in writing; but estates in land
might still be conveyed by a symbolical delivery in presence of the neighbors, without any
written instrument; though it was thought prudent to add security to the transaction by the
charter of feoffment. The statute of 29 Car. 2, commonly called the statute of frauds, has
made writing and signing essential in a great variety of cases wherein they were not so
before, and has certainly increased the necessity of caution in the English Courts, with
respect to the admission of verbal testimony, to add to or alter written instruments, in
cases coming within the provisions of that statute. That law being posterior to the date of
the charter under which this State was settled, has never had operation here; so that the
Common Law remained unaltered until the year 1715, when a partial enactment was made
of the provisions of the English statute.").
52. See id. at 427.
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testimony of slippery memory, and should be perilous to purchasers,
farmers, &c," 53 the court was of the opinion that:
[T]he parties, by making a written memorial of their
transaction, have implicitly agreed, that in the event of any
future misunderstanding, that writing shall be referred to, as the
proof of their act and intention: that such obligations as arose
from the paper, by just construction or legal intendment, should
be valid and compulsory on them; but that they would not
subject themselves to any stipulations beyond their contract;
because, if they meant to be bound by any such, they might
have added them to the writing; and thus have given them a
clearness, a force, and a direction, which they could not have by
being trusted to the memory of a witness. For this end, the
paper is signed, is witnessed, and is mistakenly recorded.54
As the discussion of presumptions below indicates, the influence
of Smith v. Williams is still discernible.55 However, the convenience
emphasized by the court in Smith v. Williams as a rationale for
precluding proof of a contemporaneous oral agreement has so far
proven elusive. Ironically, this rule that purports to provide the
courts with a certainty-filter for the legally effective words of a
contract lacks both a common vocabulary and a commonly
acknowledged methodology. 6
II. DISCUSSION MODEL

Because not even the most elementary discussion can proceed
without words that have recognizable meaning and a framework for
organizing decisions, a model of the utmost simplicity is set out here.
It represents the author's own idea of the most basic skeleton of a
useful composite rule, developed over years of teaching and after
having read virtually all the North Carolina PER cases. Some of its
parts reflect widespread consensus, while others are derived from
North Carolina practice or, where there is uncertainty or conflict,

53. Id. at 432.
54. Id. at 430-31.
55. See infra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
56. Mooney, supra note 20, at 372 ("In part, the parol evidence rule is so 'dark and
difficult' for us all because, amazingly, there exists even today no definitive statement of
the rule."). Peter Linzer says, "[slo, instead of a parol evidence 'rule,' there is a
continuum of many different approaches, all using the same name and often using the
same words." Linzer, supra note 12, at 807.
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from what the author considers best practice. 7 The model is offered
here for the sake of convenience rather than in contention for its
merit. 8 It is intended to provide the least controversial generic
background against which the startling differences between
Williston's and Corbin's versions of the PER may also be compared
with a minimum of confusion. Those who are already knowledgeable
should find the model no impediment, while those with less
confidence in their mastery of the rule may find it useful to come
back to the model periodically throughout later sections of this
Article. Although it provides a template by which North Carolina
practice may be evaluated, its simplicity should make it useful
elsewhere as well.
The PER benefits from a fresh start, albeit only a hypothetical
and limited one, for much that is wrong with it is probably owed to its
unbearable and inescapable complexity. To maintain the usefulness
of the model, subissues are omitted from it and it is constructed to
minimize controversy. As fascinating as the threads of controversy
are, any inclination to pursue them has been resisted in the interest of
maintaining the focus of this Article. 9
Because the author's
observation is that attorneys as well as students are often mystified by
the Restatements' use of specialized language such as "integration,"
"partial integration" and "total integration," that terminology is
avoided in this Article except for an occasional parenthetical to
57. Where the model reflects the author's opinion about best practice, the issues are
explored below in text rather than here as a justification for inclusion in the model. See
infra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
58. There are too many variations of the PER in North Carolina and elsewhere, to
make a credible contention for correctness. However, it is as unobjectionable as the
author can make it. Those readers who prefer to compare the Discussion Model to an
"official" version may wish to consult Restatement (Second) of Contracts sections 209-18
(PER) and sections 200-04 (Interpretation); many other provisions pertain to each of
these topics. This recommendation is for readers' convenience and is not intended to
suggest that the second Restatement is more authoritative than any other version of either
the PER or the rules of interpretation of contracts.
59. However, it may help the experienced reader to know where controversy is an
unavoidable part of or adjunct to the simple rule of the model, especially since not all
controversy is recognized by the courts whose opinions reveal it. What sort of writing is
required for the rule's application and what indicates that the parties regard it as final are
issues that have produced controversy in North Carolina without the courts'
acknowledgement. Issues that seem to have generated conscious controversy include the
test for inconsistency/contradiction as opposed to permissible supplementation
(particularly with regard to terms implied by law), the test for completeness, the degree to
which interpretation is implicated in the PER proper, the test for ambiguity and the
relevance of ambiguity to the PER (as opposed to interpretation), and applicability of the
plain meaning rule to exclude a meaning shared by both parties. This list is not
exhaustive.
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prevent confusion. Ordinary words seem sufficient and are more
likely to reduce confusion than to add to it.
I. TERMS OF THE CONTRACT 0
A. A final written contract61 ("integration' ' 62) bars contradictory
extrinsic terms from any prior agreement (oral or written) or from a
contemporaneousoralagreement ["extrinsic terms ,63].
B. A written contract that is not only final' but also complete
("total integration") bars not only contradictory but also
supplementary extrinsic terms.

60. Words in bold are central terms discussed in more detail later in this Article.
61. 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 588. A writing that is not fairly characterized as "the
contract" is safe from the PER, although it may raise statute of frauds issues. See 4
CAROLINE N. BROWN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (STATUTE OF FRAUDS) § 22.1 (Joseph
M. Perillo ed., 1997).
62. Wigmore is said to have begun the usage of "integration" to designate finality,
although it is sometimes attributed to Williston. 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 588. The
terminology was adopted in the Restatement of Contracts and continued in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and in Corbin's treatise. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
"Total" or
CONTRACTS § 209 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 228 (1932).
"complete" integration indicates not merely finality, but also completeness, while "partial"
integration denotes an agreement that is final, but does not include all matters agreed to.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210 (1981).
63. "Extrinsic terms" in this Article is used as a shorthand indication of terms not in
the written contract that are vulnerable to being barred by the PER. All agree that these
include all prior oral and written agreements and contemporaneous oral agreements, but
there is less unanimity about contemporaneous writings. These are often included as part
of the final writing, or treated as separate "collateral" agreements that are enforceable
apart from the writing. Corbin's treatment of contemporaneous written agreements is
slightly different from that used here, but not for reasons that would undermine the
discussion of the rule in this Article. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 588. Corbin seems to

have subsumed such agreements within the major labels of "prior" or "subsequent," with
the ordinary effect of such timing. Id. Thus, another writing roughly contemporaneous
with the written contract might be deemed prior and so within the exclusion of the rule, or
subsequent and hence outside its reach as an ordinary modification. Id. In North
Carolina, contemporaneous writings are generously given effect as part of the final writing
("integration"). Zinn v. Walker, 87 N.C. App. 325, 334, 361 S.E.2d 314, 319 (1987)
("[S]eparate contracts relating to the same subject matter and executed simultaneously by
the same parties may be construed as one agreement." (citing 3 CORBIN, supra note 3,
§ 578; 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 578 (Supp. 1984); Williams
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 83 A.D.2d 434, 439-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981))). This is true even
where one contract states that there are no other agreements between the parties. See 3
CORBIN, supra note 3, § 578; Chapel Hill Spa Health Club, Inc. v. Goodman, 90 N.C. App.
198, 202, 368 S.E.2d 60, 62 (1988) ("A general rule of contracts is that all
contemporaneously executed instruments relating to the subject matter of the contract are
to be construed together in order to determine what was undertaken and to effectuate the
intention of the parties.").
64. Finality under this rule is identical to that under the preceding rule in I.A. See
supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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C. The PER never bars later agreements;65 nor does it bar relevant
extrinsic evidence introducedto prove invalidity or that no contract was
made.66
67
IL MEANING (INTERPRETATION)
65. Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 607 (1944). "It is
now perfectly clear that informal contracts, whether written or oral, can be modified and
discharged by a subsequent agreement, whether written or oral." Id.
66. See Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at 167-70. Fraud may thus be shown
by extrinsic evidence, but not if the writing itself negates it, for example, by making clear
that no such representation was made or relied upon. It should be noted that unlike the
PER, the statute of frauds may bar a later agreement if a term required by the statute is
omitted from the writing and no exception applies. See Corbin, supra note 65, at 609-10; 4
BROWN, supra note 61, § 22.1. When the statute of frauds is considered, care should be
taken to be sure the omitted term is actually required by the statute to be in the writing.
Under the U.C.C. rule, U.C.C. § 2-201 (1977), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201 (2007), the only
term required is quantity. For an argument that not even quantity is required, see 4
BROWN, supra note 61, § 21.2; Caroline N. Bruckel (now Brown), Consideration in
Exclusive and Nonexclusive Open Quantity Contracts Under the U.C.C.: A Proposal for a
New System of Validation, 68 MINN. L. REV. 117 passim (1983). Section 2-209 of the
U.C.C., codified at section 25-2-209 of the North Carolina General Statutes, does not add
essential terms to the statute of frauds writing. The PER, which attaches exclusionary
legal consequences to a writing, should not be confused with the statute of frauds, which
attaches similar legal consequences to the absence of a writing. Under the U.C.C., a nooral-modification clause may also preclude oral modification, although the common law is
to the contrary. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1977). Like the North Carolina citations, references to
the uniform version of U.C.C. Article 2 are to the original Code as enacted by states, not
to the 2003 revision.
67. Whether interpretation is a part of the parol evidence rule is not a matter of
perfect consensus. See Linzer, supra note 12, at 800-01 nn.6-12. Linzer greeted the issue
with his own contribution to the rule's collection of metaphor: "[T]he parol evidence rule
and the plain meaning rule are conjoined like Siamese twins. Even though many
academics and more than a few judges have tried to separate them, the bulk of the legal
profession views them as permanently intertwined." Id. at 801. The decision to include
interpretation here is a pragmatic one, reflecting what the North Carolina courts do. The
issue of ambiguity is a central theme of the cases whether they sound in PER or
interpretation, with parties shifting fluidly from one topic to the other and the courts
seeming to mix the two. Meaning attributed to words in a written contract may be based
upon extrinsic evidence that indicates agreement (sometimes tacit or implied) between the
parties. In such cases, courts may understandably bring to bear the principles of the parol
evidence rule to determine admissibility of the extrinsic agreement: it seems a pointless
cavil to object based upon doctrinal purity. The dictionary that is applied to contract
terms may be a public one or an idiosyncratic one reflecting common purposes or
background. It is not a big stretch to think of such a thing as a contract term. It might be
asserted that interpretation does not vary depending upon integration or complete
integration. See 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.12 (rev. ed.
1998). However, the North Carolina cases give so little attention to a formal analysis of
complete integration as to obfuscate any distinction. Furthermore, under Williston's view
(the first Restatement's), integration does make a difference. See Calamari & Perillo,
supra note 18, at 347.
This part of the model is limited to issues pertinent to this Article except insofar as
is necessary to provide context. This model is based on current North Carolina case law,
rather than on general precepts, and is offered not as a set of rules that govern
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A. Unambiguous words in a written contract are given their
ordinary or "plain"meaning," except that
1. The parties'actual mutual understanding69 applies unless made
irrelevant by separate rule of law such as record notice for real
70
property,
2. One party's understanding applies if the facts indicate that the
other ought to bear the risk of disagreement or misunderstanding,71 or
3. A meaning applies that is appropriatelysupported by evidence
of a trade usage or custom, course of dealing, or course of
performance.
B. Extrinsic evidence is admissible to resolve ambiguity7 2 in a
written contract. Ambiguity may be shown, inter alia, by
1. A conflict in the terms of the writing,

interpretation, but as a framework to which the PER may be appended for discussion,
insofar as it implicates interpretation. Because it is not reflected in North Carolina cases,
the Discussion Model makes no mention of the Restatement (Second)-Corbin-type rule
allowing extrinsic evidence of meaning without a preliminary finding of ambiguity. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(c) (1981).
68. See Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at 172. This is a well-established
practice in North Carolina. Chadbourn and McCormick note the "local rule that only an

ambiguity can be explained," which provides a safeguard "against manufactured testimony
tending to overthrow the clear meaning of the writing judged by popular standards in the
use of words." Id.
69. For further discussion of how North Carolina courts recognize the parties' agreed
understanding of terms, see infra note 269.
70. The courts often fail to distinguish between cases in which record notice is
required to make a mutual intention effective and those where it is not. Compare Runyon
v. Paley, 331 N.C. 293, 313, 416 S.E.2d 177, 190-91 (1992) (excluding evidence of parties'
intentions in absence of any public record explaining ambiguous deed language by
reference to parties' situation or surrounding circumstances) with Walton v. City of
Raleigh, 342 N.C. 879, 882, 467 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1996) (imposing subsequent regulations
pursuant to language of consent judgment held unambiguous and construed contrary to
the understanding of both original parties). The effectiveness of a mutually intended
meaning in an ordinary contract was strongly advocated by Corbin, but not acknowledged
by Williston if the agreement was fully integrated, even if the "plain meaning" was
something neither of the parties subscribed to.
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21(a) (1981); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 71 (1932). The risk may be allocated by fault in causing or failing to clear
up the other's misunderstanding or by a strong rule placing the risk upon the party
drafting the contract, as in insurance contracts. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 71.
72. Some cases allow extrinsic evidence, but not the parties' own testimony or
affidavits. In North Carolina this is rarely explained except in cases like Runyon, 331 N.C.
at 313, 416 S.E.2d at 191, in which record notice is required because the contract affects an
interest in land. It may be that confusion with the Dead Man's Statute is involved. It
seems to the author highly unlikely that a North Carolina court in the twenty-first century
would embrace a position excluding the parties' mutual intentions as to the meaning of an
ambiguous or even an unambiguous term.
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2. The absence of any application for the term within the four
corners of the writing,73
3. Susceptibility of the term to more than one reasonablemeaning,
or
4. Susceptibility of the term to either of the parties' meanings.
III. THE BIG SPLIT
The great PER dispute is whether and to what degree a writing
may prove its own completeness as against otherwise relevant
evidence to the contrary. This great question permeates issues of
completeness, contradiction, and ambiguity, but not finality, which is
regarded by all as a matter of actual intention.74 In most jurisdictions,
completeness is the crucial issue, but in North Carolina, at least below
the level of the state supreme court,7 5 the quarrel seems to permeate
the entire PER landscape, inexplicably drawing the interpretation
element of ambiguity into the mix. It seems likely that the principal
difficulty in North Carolina is confusion, rather than a theoretical
split. State courts characteristically resort to a fragmentary collection
of formulae chosen from prior cases. In any given case, it is
impossible to guess which formula will be chosen. Often inconsistent
formulae are layered one upon the other.
Traditionally, it has been well established that the PER and
interpretation issues turn on the parties' "intentions," but the
meaning of that word is a matter of fierce disagreement. Two
opposing schools of thought are recognized, Williston's often being
characterized as "conservative" 76 while Corbin's is called "liberal." 77
Given the vicissitudes of academic politics,7" those descriptors are
useful more to predict the comparative likelihood of extrinsic terms
coming in than to signal alignment with conventional politics.7 9
73. See Posner, supra note 2, at 535.
74. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 228 (1932); 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 588; 2

WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 633 n.13.
75. The supreme court hears many fewer PER cases than does the court of appeals.
76. See Mark L. Movsesian, Williston as Conservative-Pragmatist,32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 135
passim (2007).
77. Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There is a Parol Evidence Rule in
California-The Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995).
78. See, e.g., Ian R. MacNeil, RelationalContract Theory: Challenges and Queries,94
NW. U. L. REV. 877, 882 n.28 (2000) ("[L]iberal pragmatism underlay the work of the likes
of Arthur Corbin and Karl Llewellyn and the many other drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code."); Martin-Davidson, supra note 77, at 12 (discussing the liberality of
Corbin's viewpoint).
79. See generally Peter Linzer's characteristically pungent comment: "For the past
quarter-century, the Democrats have sounded like Republicans, the Republicans made
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Williston's view, expressed in the first Restatement of Contracts in
1932, looked to the writing itself as the best proof of intent under the
PER." What was indicated within the "four corners" of a writing
trumped extrinsic evidence under the rule,"' even in the face of clear
proof that the parties agreed to something quite different from what
the writing said.82 Intent, to Williston, was a legal concept, not a
factual one, at least in this context.83 Corbin, at the opposite extreme,
together with the Restatement (Second) and the Uniform Commercial
Code,' conceived of intent as a factual matter referring to the parties'
actual intentions. s The goal of contract law, as he saw it, was to give
effect to those intentions whenever possible. Not surprisingly, while
the PER loomed large in Williston's system, justified (as he thought)
by predictability and certainty, it was no favorite of Corbin's."6
Experience seems to give the victory to Corbin. Williston
expected his version of the PER to diminish litigation, enhancing
uniformity, but its history fails to substantiate his hopes even in New
York-a Williston jurisdiction if there ever was one.87 Judge Dyer of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals elaborated upon the case law:
Barry Goldwater into an environmental activist, and the law-and-economics boys and girls
have done their best to paint Llewellyn, Corbin and the like as wooly-headed idealists who
never met a payroll." Peter Linzer, "Implied," "Inferred," and "Imposed": Default Rules
and Adhesion Contracts-The Need for Radical Surgery, 28 PACE L. REV. 195, 216 (2008).
80. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 3, §§ 631-50.
81. See McKay v. Cameron, 231 N.C. 658, 660,58 S.E.2d 638, 639 (1950).
82. An excellent example is Smith v. Williams, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 426 (1810), discussed
supra in notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
83. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 633. "That the intention of the parties is not
relevant in courts adopting the same approach as Williston has been recognized in a
number of opinions." Calamari & Perillo, supra note 18, at 340.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-202 (2007) (PER); § 25-1-303 (revised Art. I on course of
dealing, course of performance, and usage of trade, merging original §§ 25-1-205 and 25-2208). Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter of the U.C.C. and drafter of Article 2, was the
prot6g6 of Corbin. The U.C.C. is omitted from substantive discussion here.
85. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 18, at 339 ("When Professor Corbin speaks of
the intent of the parties he emphatically means their actual expressed intent.").
86. 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 582 ("It would have been far better had no such rule
ever been stated."); see also Corbin. supra note 65 passim (describing his opposition to the
PER).
87. See Linzer, supra note 12, at 807 ("In a vast variety of contractual settings those
principles have been the subject of a long line of modern Court of Appeals decisions
before and since [the 'hard' PER was reinstated in the strongest terms in] the seminal 1990
decision W.W.W. Associates, Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639 (N.Y. 1990). Not
surprisingly, not only in the Court of Appeals, but in the state court system generally, the
most frequently litigated issue in commercial controversies concerns the exclusion or
admission of parol evidence in determining the meaning and effect of written agreements
and instruments. This has spawned a vast number of Appellate Division and lower court
decisions." (citing Calamari & Perillo, supra note 18, at 343-44)); Stephen Rackow Kaye,
The Parol Evidence Rule Generally, in 3 NEW YORK PRACTICE SERIES-COMMERCIAL
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Interspersed in this quagmire are quicksand-like state court
decisions, which appear equitable in specific situations but
remain perilous for legal precedent. Federal courts, attempting
to clarify, have sometimes but confused and compounded
muddled interpretation of the axiom. Thus we tread cautiously
in this morass.88
He did find some solace in "the relatively sure path of New York
law." 89 Still, even in New York, the rule creates havoc. In 1990, New
York's high court attempted once more to lay down the law in
W. W. W. Associates, Inc. v. Giancontieri.9° If the number of cases
citing Giancontieri is any indication,91 the effort has not been
successful in stemming litigation. Long ago, Corbin had had enough,
exclaiming, "[A]re we to continue like a flock of sheep to beg the
question at issue, even when its result is to 'make a contract for the
parties,' one that is vitally different from the one they made for
themselves?"92
Corbin's sheep metaphor is well taken, for what is at issue is not
a small thing. It is not a matter of semantics or methodology or
technicalities, nor is it ultimately a question of admitting or excluding
evidence. The stunning import of the PER goes much further,
expanding the effect of the statute of frauds well beyond the
categories of contracts it encompasses. The effect of the PER, in the
all,93
final analysis, is to prohibit oral agreements from being made9 at
4
at least in transactions important enough to produce a writing.
The PER serves well enough to guard negotiated deals from
superseded terms,95 but that is a function well outside the scope of
LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 41:9 (2d. ed. 2008), available at 3 N.Y. Prac.,
Com. Litig. In New York State Courts § 41:9 (2d ed.) (Westlaw).
88. Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir. 1971).

89. Id.
90. 566 N.E.2d 639 (N.Y. 1990).
91. It is said to have been cited 567 times in seventeen years. Kaye, supra note 87,

§ 41:9.
"
92. 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 582.
93. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 631 (noting Williston's agreement with the

holding in Dollar v. Int'l Banking Corp., 109 P. 499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1910)); Calamari
& Perillo, supra note 18, at 340 (citing Dollar, 109 P. at 503). The rule also bars prior
written agreements, but its practical effect is limited to sequentially negotiated deals.
Transactions involving repeated written drafts do not involve the unsophisticated and
unrepresented.
94. See 4 BROWN, supra note 61, § 12.1. The statute of frauds furthers this goal by
imposing a writing requirement upon significant categories of contracts. Id.
95. There is little evidence that the rule is needed for this purpose. The case law
indicates that transactions negotiated over time are treated by the parties as representing
interpretation issues rather than PER ones. See, e.g., State v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 359
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experience of most ordinary people, who do not make contracts by a
process of negotiated drafts. Faxes and e-mail reduce the likelihood
of a bad experience under the PER for many entrepreneurs and small
businesses who might otherwise be at risk, 96 protecting them by
contemporaneous writings that are outside the rule, or better still, by
modifications.97 Otherwise the PER is a wolf, hell-bent on tearing to
pieces the freedom of contract of Corbin's sheep. Because the rule
makes no distinction between significant commercial transactions and
home repair contracts, its effect is especially alarming for the
consumer. We, who never get a chance to negotiate anyway, listen
credulously as the salesperson (who also believes what he is saying)
assures us: "Just sign this. It's just a formality. Don't worry-I've
never seen it enforced in all the years I've been with the company.
That's not how we do business. I'd change it if I had the authority,
but it's a nationwide form. Here, call my boss .... No, she can't
change it either."9'
Not surprisingly, strong feelings have been expressed about
subsuming the parties' clearly proven mutual intentions to a paper
construct, but not everyone finds it abhorrent.
Williston was
convinced it served higher principles.99 Even before the case that is
credited with the birth of the PER,' 0 we are told that Justice Brook
01
"thundered from the bench":

N.C. 763, 772-81, 618 S.E.2d 219. 225-30 (2005) (interpreting the effect of the Fair and
Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 on the National Tobacco Grower Settlement
Trust; neither party argued that an extrinsic term should be recognized).
96. The usefulness of faxes and e-mails to avoid PER issues was suggested in an email to the author by Jim Phillips of Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard,
LLP in Greensboro, N.C. and, at the time, Chair of the UNC Board of Governors. See Email from Jim Phillips, Attorney, Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, LLP,
to Caroline N. Brown, Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law
(Apr. 27, 2009, 09:22:08 EDT) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
97. Modifications, being neither prior nor contemporaneous, are universally held
impervious to the PER. See Brown v. Mitchell, 168 N.C. 312, 313-14, 84 S.E. 404, 405
(1915); McKinney v. Mathews, 166 N.C. 576, 580, 82 S.E. 1036, 1037 (1914): Biggers v.
Evangelist, 71 N.C. App. 35, 44, 321 S.E.2d 524, 530 (1984); Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Jordan. 5 N.C. App. 249. 253, 168 S.E.2d 229, 232 (1969); 2 STANSBURY, supra note 26,
§ 259.

98. One strategy sometimes effective in such circumstances is to agree to sign the
contract if a handwritten amendment is signed afterwards.
authority, however.

The salesperson may lack

99. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 607; accord RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 230
illus. 1 (1932) (noting that a term has the single objective meaning attributed to it by a
hypothetical "reasonably intelligent person").
100. The Countess of Rutland's Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 89 (K.B.). For a discussion
of the historical significance of this case, see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
101. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 18, at 348.
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The party ought to direct his meaning according to the law, and
not the law according to his meaning, for if a man should bend
the law to the intent of the party rather than the intent of the
party to the law, this would be the way to introduce
barborousness and ignorance and to destroy all learning and
diligence."2
The contrary view was expressed even more furiously by Jeremy
Bentham, condemning what he called "an enormity, an act of
barefaced injustice ... a practice exactly upon a par (impunity
1
excepted) with forgery. 103
IV. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AS APPLIED IN NORTH CAROLINA

In North Carolina, the influence of each of the viewpoints set out
above is discernible in the cases, although it is not the goal of this
Article to parse them. Sometimes the courts seem to make a de facto
compromise between the two extremes of Williston and Corbin.
Perhaps because the adversaries use the same terminology, opposite
elements often coexist in the same case without apparent judicial
awareness of the dissonance. Although there are discrete instances of
its sensible and principled application, for most purposes the PER in
North Carolina is broken, all that remains being fragmentary pieces.
A.

Well-Reasoned Categories

As indicated above, there are some contexts in which the
state's courts apply the PER with a particularly sure hand, producing
results that seem well reasoned and predictable. North Carolina
courts are adept at applying the PER in the context of merger clauses,
whether businesses..4 or consumers"5 are affected. Merger clauses

102. Id. (quoting Thockmerton v. Tracy, (1554) 75 Eng. Rep. 222, 251 (K.B.)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. (quoting 5 JEREMY BENTHAM. RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 590
(London, Hunt and Clarke 1827)). For a discussion of Bentham's views on the importance
of written contracts see id. at 341 n.4i.
104. See, e.g., Med. Staffing Network, Inc. v. Ridgway, - N.C. App.
-, 670 S.E.2d
321, 326 (2009). For a further discussion of this case. see infra notes 262-67 and
accompanying text. See also Zinn v. Walker, 87 N.C. App. 325, 333. 361 S.E.2d 314. 318
(1997) ("Where giving effect to the merger clause would frustrate and distort the parties'
true intentions and understanding regarding the contract, the clause will not be enforced:
'... to permit the standardized language in the printed forms. ... to nullify the clearly
understood and expressed intent of the contracting parties would lead to a patently unjust
and absurd result . .. .' When, however, as in the present case, the parties' conduct
indicates their intentions to include collateral agreements or writings despite the existence
of the merger clause and the parol evidence is not markedly different, if at all, from the
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represent the parties' explicit agreement about the effectiveness of
their extrinsic agreements and so are peripheral to the focus of this
Article. However, the importance of these cases justifies their brief
mention here to acknowledge the courts' adept handling of them,
balancing the rebuttable presumption created by the clause against
context and parties' conduct, while looking for meaningful agreement
and clear intentions.
State courts also produce consistent and well-reasoned opinions
in certain categories of cases in which the result follows historically
strong public policies or where frequent litigation yields a seasoned
and expert judiciary." 6 These include insurance contracts, restrictive
covenants, and separation agreements with their related consent
judgments. The first two categories usually involve interpretation,
which the courts typically conduct with care and subtlety, construing
them fairly and, where ambiguity is found, applying well-established
and policy-derived rules of construction against the insurer-drafter
and against restrictions on land use. Separation agreements, whether
or not made consent judgments, are messier doctrinally, the context
probably explaining why the courts use a "harder"" PER approach
to enhance certainty of arrangements between divorcing spouses by
excluding terms that are omitted entirely from the writing, and at the
same time a "softer" approach when interpretation is at issue.'"' In
this way, by interpreting the written terms liberally, they ascertain the
parties' actual intentions, giving them effect whenever both sides'
arguments are plausible. In the process, they also avoid fatal
indefiniteness," 9 a real risk in agreements that are often poorly

written contract, the parties' intentions should prevail." (quoting Loving Co. v. Latham, 20
N.C. App. 318. 329, 201 S.E.2d 516. 524 (1974))).
105. See Chapel Hill Spa Health Club, Inc. v. Goodman, 90 N.C. App. 198, 202, 368
S.E.2d 60, 62 (1988) (avoiding the effect of the merger clause partly on the grounds that
other writings relating to the same subject matter and signed contemporaneously are to be
construed together).

106. Although the courts are to be congratulated upon the excellence of opinions in
which the judges have expertise born of experience, these opinions actually underline the
serious problem with the PER. A rule making the admissibility of evidence rest upon a
judge's conclusions about finality. completeness, or "plain meaning" is just as predictable
as the judge making the determination.
107. See Posner, supra note 2, at 534. The terms have their intuitive meaning, so that
"hard" denotes Williston's PER, attributing insofar as possible a fixed meaning to the
written word. "Soft" refers to Corbin's version, which seeks the parties' actual intentions.
See id.
108. See id
109. A good example is found in Judge Hunter's dissent in Jackson v. Jackson, 169
N.C. App. 46. 54. 610 S.E.2d 731. 736 (2005) (Hunter. J.. dissenting), rev'd and remanded
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drafted, sometimes by the parties themselves, and which may reflect
emotional and economic stresses foreign to commercial agreements.
Although the courts always recite the applicability of general contract
principles, these cases represent groups in which a high degree of
predictability is possible.
B.

General Confusion

The fragments of the North Carolina PER appear scattered
indiscriminately throughout the cases. The choices available to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina are not limited to accepting
Corbin's invitation to discard the PER, or, at the opposite pole,
embracing Williston's hard rule to make most extrinsic evidence
inadmissible to supplement written contracts.
There are many
options between these two extremes.
The discussion below highlights issues of difficulty and confusion
in the North Carolina PER cases. It is organized by reference to the
Discussion Model.11 However, when the cases vary from the model,
the terminology used to introduce sections and subsections of the
discussion is drawn from the cases. The discussion is intended to
facilitate a comparison between the North Carolina cases and
generally accepted conventions of the PER.
1. Finality
a.

The First Requirement: A Written Contract

In determining whether the PER is applicable, a court's first task
is to determine whether the parties' contract has been reduced to a
writing intended by the parties to be final as to one or more of its
terms. 1
There are two parts to this inquiry, the first being the
ascertainment of a writing of such a nature as to call into application
the PER. The author has found no version of the PER that does not
condition its application upon the parties' having reduced their
agreement to writing. Only a writing that constitutes "the contract" is
entitled to the protection of the PER." 2 Lesser writings, such as an
per curiam, 360 N.C. 56, 620 S.E.2d 862 (2005) (grounding the reversal in the reasons
stated in Judge Hunter's dissent).
110. See supra Part II.
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(2) (1981); supra notes 61-62

and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 588 ("The 'parol evidence rule,' in whatever
form it is stated, never purports to be applicable unless the 'contract' has been reduced to
'writing.' There must be a 'written contract.' ").
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evidentiary memorandum or a note or informal summary, do not
invoke the rule." 3 However, the written contract need not be
complete to qualify. 4 That makes the nature of the requisite writing
elusive, so that it is all the more crucial that a court confronting
anything but the most formal contract take care to address the issue
explicitly. When the parties have conceded or assumed that a writing
is final, the court should acknowledge such facts explicitly to avoid
setting a dangerous precedent of skipping the issue of finality.
It is absolutely essential that the PER be reserved for written
contracts; care must be taken to avoid applying the rule to anything
less than the parties' intentional and conscious reduction of agreed
terms to writing. This is so important because of the disastrous
nature of the PER's effect upon the parties' agreement in other cases.
Once invoked, the rule protects the writing from extrinsic evidence
that the court believes to be contradictory.115 The contradictory term
is inadmissible, even when both parties acknowledge that they
actually made the extrinsic agreement. 1 6 Furthermore, it is a small
step to an erroneous finding of completeness that bars all oral terms.
The danger of erroneously allowing a lesser writing to trigger the
rule is brought home most vividly when one considers that the PER
bars promises made orally in the very act of executing the writing." 7
To illustrate the danger, suppose the buyer of a violin jots down a
receipt.
It says "Payment in full is acknowledged for one
Stradivarius.. ' . 8 The buyer, who is concertmaster for a major
symphony orchestra, says to the seller as she hands the receipt to him
for his initials, "I'm persuaded this is the real thing, even though your
price is so low. Of course, I'll have its provenance established
professionally. It'll be one of my favorites, though, no matter what."
113. See id. Such informal writings often satisfy the statute of frauds, which is quite
another matter. See 4 BROWN, supra note 61, § 22.1.
114. See Mooney, supra note 20, at 384-85 (challenging the Oregon courts to examine a
writing carefully for finality and subsequently to avoid a presumption of completeness).
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(2) (1981). The issue, though
one of fact, is for the court. Id.
116. For example, the trial court returned a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for
the defendant in Hoots v. Calaway, 15 N.C. App. 346, 353, 190 S.E.2d 328, 332 (1972),
affd, 282 N.C. 477, 488, 193 S.E.2d 709, 716 (1973), setting aside a jury verdict for the
plaintiff based upon the jury's finding that the seller had made an extrinsic promise to
repay the buyer for any shortfall of acreage. Id. The court of appeals' reversal and the
supreme court's affirmation thereof were based upon a holding that the evidence did not
contradict the writing. Id.
117. The author has not found any version of the PER that does not bar extrinsic
evidence from a contemporaneous oral agreement.
118. The facts are drawn very loosely from Smith v. Zimbalist, 38 P.2d 170, 170 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1934). The case had nothing to do with the PER.
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Later, when the violin turns out to be merely valuable but not a
Stradivarius, she sues the seller for damages for breach of warranty,
claiming that the value of the violin as a Stradivarius would have been
thirty percent higher than the purchase price. The writing may be
held to have created an express warranty that the violin is a
Stradivarius. If the court also holds that the writing invokes the PER
and that it was meant to be the final expression of the terms it
includes,119 its effect will be to prevent proof of the buyer's oral
statement, which contradicts the written "warranty." She might as
well never have said that she planned to have the violin's provenance
established by an expert, that she was purchasing it for its excellence
in her own estimation, or that she accepted the risk that the violin was
not a Stradivarius. Even if the buyer is truthful about everything, the
seller will be held liable for damages. The consequences are
catastrophic if a court misses the condition that restricts the PER to
written contracts, and not anything less.
Like other parts of the PER, the first requirement is easy to
express, but not always so easy to apply. The extremes of an informal
note or receipt and a formal contract ceremonially signed after a
completed process of negotiation ought to be handled with dispatch.
However, there are recent cases in North Carolina that undermine
such a confident declaration. In Hoots v. Calaway,2 ° the vendor's
son, an attorney, handwrote on a legal pad a "Memorandum of Sale"
just after the buyer of two tracts of farmland near Advance, North
Carolina had given his check for the down payment. The writing
recited the total price, acknowledged the receipt of the down
payment, and set out details of installment payments and escrow, but
it described the land simply as "2 farms in Advance, N.C. (400 acres
more or less).' 121 It was signed only by the seller, Calaway. Hoots
later discovered the land was some forty-two acres short of the 400 he
said were guaranteed by Calaway, who had promised to refund the
$275 per acre purchase price in that event.2 2 Alleging that the price
had been quoted to him per acre, Hoots sued for the refund. The trial
court excluded his evidence on PER grounds, but the supreme court
affirmed the appellate court's reversal. 23
119. See infra Part IV.B.1.b (discussing intention in the context of finality).
120. 282 N.C. 477, 193 S.E.2d 709 (1973).
121. Id. at 481, 193 S.E.2d at 712.
122. Id. at 480, 193 S.E.2d at 711. In fact, Hoots recounted Calaway's reassuring him
by telling Hoots of his own refund from the prior seller in similar circumstances. Id.
123. Hoots v. Calaway, 15 N.C. App. 346, 353, 190 S.E.2d 328, 332 (1972) (reversing the
trial court's exclusion of extrinsic evidence), affd, 282 N.C. 477, 488, 193 S.E.2d 709, 716
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Chief Justice Bobbitt's opinion began auspiciously: "When a
'
contract is reduced to writing, parol evidence cannot be admitted."124
He was attentive to the evidence, describing the writing as being "on
its face.., an informal document" acknowledged by the seller to have
been intended as a receipt and "a summary recital of the payment
terms and agreement as to the sale, but not the complete
agreement., 125 At this point, the court should have determined
whether the Memorandum of Sale was a written contract. Although
completeness is not required to trigger the PER, the Memorandum's
omission of any description of the land cannot be attributable to any
26
intention consistent with reduction of the contract terms to writing.
Certainly it would be plausible to omit a legal description at this
point, but when the buyer has already paid the down payment,
something more descriptive than the land's proximity to Advance
would be expected in a "written contract."
Calaway's
acknowledgment that the writing was meant as a receipt for payment
could be indicative that only the payment terms could safely be
regarded as reduced to writing. 127 However, on this issue, which is
preliminary to and a condition for the application of the PER, all
relevant evidence comes to bear.128 Hoot's credible evidence of
Calaway's assurances to him about repayment for a shortfall in
acreage and the conformance of the total price to a per-acre
computation indicate that not even the payment terms were reduced
to writing in the Memorandum of Sale.
Not realizing the significance of the writing's informality and
omissions, the Hoots court went straight to the issue of the writing's
incompleteness,
skipping
the
crucial
writing requirement
altogether.129
It treated the PER as applicable, regarding the
"Memorandum of Sale" as a final writing. 30
Fortunately,
incompleteness of the writing limited the rule's effect to barring
contradictory evidence, but that meant that the court had to work to

(1973) (finding that the defendant's extrinsic promise to repay the purchase price for any
shortfall of acreage was admissible because it did not contradict the writing).
124. Hoots, 282 N.C. at 486, 193 S.E.2d at 715 (quoting Stern v. Benbow, 151 N.C. 460,
462, 66 S.E. 445, 446 (1909)).
125. Id. at 488, 193 S.E.2d at 716.
126. See id. at 481, 193 S.E.2d at 712.
127. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 588 (including receipts, inter alia, under the heading
"What is a 'Written Contract' or an 'Integration'? A Note or Memorandum Is Not an
'Integration' ").
128. 2 STANSBURY, supra note 26, § 252.
129. Hoots, 282 N.C. at 485-86, 193 S.E.2d at 714-15.
130. Id. at 488, 193 S.E.2d at 716.
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find the per-acre sale consistent 3 1 with the "total price" quoted in the
writing. More significantly, it also means that Hoots is poor
precedent for later cases involving informal writings.
Another case involving a receipt similar to that in Hoots is
Johnson v. Honeycutt.132 Honeycutt sold to Johnson a sixteen-foot
dump truck bed and equipment for $2,500 for which Johnson paid for
by check. The only writing was Honeycutt's signed receipt, which
provided: "1 16 Ft Virginian Dump Bed, Wet line, Pump Hoist &
Console. Sold to James Johnson for $2500.00. Paid check., 133 Two
years later he re-sold the truck bed for another $1,400 because
Johnson had failed to remove it.'34 When Johnson sued him, the PER
was held to bar Honeycutt's efforts to prove that a pick-up date had
been set.135 Although there are obvious credibility problems with
Honeycutt's contentions, the PER is not designed to be the means to
avoid them. Not the least of the problems with the case 13is6 that the
receipt can hardly be characterized as a "written contract.,
At the opposite pole from the informal scantiness of the
memoranda and receipts in Hoots and Johnson is Cananwill, Inc. v.
EMAR Group, Inc.,37 in which the writing is a formal, detailed,

standard commercial contract for workmen's compensation insurance
with two merger clauses as well as no-oral-modification and no-oralwaiver clauses. 38 Cananwill is a well-reasoned reminder that the
writing condition of the PER's application is only one aspect of what
is often referred to as "finality." A second inquiry is necessary to
ascertain whether the parties intended the writing as the final
expression of one or more of the contract's terms. In Cananwill, the
insurance company successfully challenged the writing's finality, but
the case leaves no doubt that the parties in Cananwillhad reduced to
writing many of the terms of their agreement.

131. It notes that the writing says "400 acres, more or less" and that the price is
consistent with Hoot's contentions. Id.
132. No. COA05-295, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 249 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2006).
133. Id. at *2.
134. Id. at *3.
135. Id. at *4-7. The court awarded treble damages for unfair and deceptive trade
practices. Id. at *5.
136. Finality of the writing as well as completeness are also issues in Johnson, since the
prohibited evidence is supplementary. See infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
Although Honeycutt conceded the PER on appeal, the court went on to discuss it.
Johnson, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 249, at *5-7. Fortunately, the case lacks precedential
effect, being unpublished.
137. 250 B.R. 533 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (mem.).
138. Id. at 538.
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Many, perhaps most, writings lie between the two poles of
Cananwilland Hoots. As to the cases in the middle, Corbin explains,
[t]here seems to be a good deal of uncertainty and
misunderstanding as to what constitutes a "written contract."
This is one of those conceptions that are looked upon as so
obvious and certain of meaning as not to require definition,
explanation, or discussion. As in many other instances the
certainty is an illusion.'3 9
Fortunately, especially when the focus is on the issue of
completeness, 14 the parties themselves often resolve this first
requirement of a "written contract," treating as a foregone conclusion
the presence or absence of the requisite writing.1 4' However, when
the issue is in contention, it is important that the court consider all
relevant evidence to determine whether a writing or writings
constitutes "the contract.' ' 42 It is clear that the writing need not be
complete, 4 3 for the PER gives a separate effect to a complete writing
over and above a merely final one, barring supplementary terms as
well as contradictory ones. 44 How, then, to determine whether a
writing is sufficient to invoke the PER in the first place? 145 What the
writing says is an important factor: for example, if it recites that it is
"the contract" or contains a merger clause, it helps to prove a
"written contract." The opposite conclusion may follow for a writing
made at a mid-point in a steady stream of communications about the
same terms. Contemplating further negotiations as to terms included
or anticipating a further formal writing indicates something less than
a "written contract." Careful assessment of all the facts will help to
ensure a proper decision in the case at bar and to ensure that it will
not be erroneously relied upon in future cases as well.

139. 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, at § 588.
140. See infra Part IV.B.2.
141. 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, at § 588.
142. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
143. A good example of a "written contract" that is not complete is the four sentence
mediated settlement agreement in Capps. v. NW Sign Indus. of N.C., No. COA06-1297,
2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1816, at *4-5 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2007). Capps is discussed
further infra at notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
144. See Cananwill, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 250 B.R. 533, 547 (M.D.N.C. 1999)

(mem.).
145. Some guidance is provided in the text and cases cited in 3 CORBIN, supra note 3,
§§ 587-88. Care should be taken, however, for Corbin often weaves together issues of
finality and completeness, which does not suggest that he was confused, but may produce
that effect in others.
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However, the mere presence of the necessary kind of writing is
not enough to make the PER applicable. As Cananwill aptly
illustrates, such a writing is a condition to the PER's applicability, but
14 7
it is not a sufficient condition.146 Finality is also required.
b. The Second Requirement: Parties'Actual Intention of
Finality
The PER does not apply at all unless the writing is intended by
the parties to be their final expression of agreement as to one or more
terms. 14 The Restatements' word is "integration,' 1 49 but the ordinary
word "finality" suffices and is used in this Article to avoid adding
1 50
another layer of complexity to an already confusing topic.
"Finality" is used in its ordinary sense to mean that the parties plan
no further negotiations'5 1 as to the particular term(s) and that they
intend the writing to trump all their prior negotiations.
146. See Cananwill, 250 B.R. at 547;supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
147. Cananwill, 250 B.R. at 547.
148. See id. (quoting HENRY BRANDIS, JR., BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 251 (2d ed. 1982)). Although signatures are indicative of the intent, it is not
necessarily fatal to a finding of finality that one signature or even both are missing if the
explanation is sufficiently persuasive. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, §§ 587-88 (examining
what sorts of writings trigger application of the PER). The focus is on the parties' intent
to reduce at least one of the terms to a final writing. No particular formalities are
required, although their presence or absence may be important factors indicating the
parties' intent as to formality. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 18, at 336. The writing
need not contain all the terms to trigger the PER, but it must be intended as the final
expression of agreement for the terms included. See id. If the last expression is not in
writing, the PER does not apply. See id. at 334; see also 2 WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 631
(articulating that subsequent oral statements are not admitted under the PER).
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(1) (1981) ("An integrated
agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of
an agreement."). For explication of the reasons for the special terminology of the
Restatements, see 3 CORBIN, supra note 3,§ 539.
150. McCormick emphasizes the theoretical significance of the word "integration":
"Where an earlier tentative oral expression is followed by a later writing, then if the
writing was intended to supersede the earlier expression, the law gives it that effect. This.
in effect, is the theory of 'integration.' " McCormick, supra note 38, at 374. This author
wonders with Corbin whether "new confusion was caused and [whether] it has been used
according to the system of Humpty Dumpty rather than with the meaning of Wigmore. It
certainly has not yet simplified the application of the 'parol evidence rule' or eliminated
the previously prevailing variations and inconsistencies." 3 CORBIN, supra note 3. § 588.
For the reasons cited by Corbin, this Article abandons the language of integration in favor
of ordinary language. See id.
151. The PER does not prevent the parties from changing their minds. If in the future
they modify the written term, the PER does not bar proof of the modification. This is
implicit in the very rule itself, which affects only prior and contemporaneous extrinsic
terms, not future ones. In this, the Discussion Model is accurate for every version of the
PER. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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Whether the parties have intended the writing to be final is a2
factual issue upon which all relevant evidence is brought to bear.1
This includes, but is not limited to, the writing itself, even if it has a
merger clause.153 Of course, the PER does not prevent the extrinsic
agreement's being proven for this purpose, since the rule is not even
applicable until a final written contract has been established. The
issue of finality can never be determined by the application of the
PER, for the rule rests upon the finding of finality, not the other way
around.
The issue of a writing's finality is traditionally characterized as
one of law, but only because it is decided by the court sitting without
a jury. 5 4 Substantively, the practice is the same in North Carolina.'55
It makes sense that the court should hear the issue of intent to make a
final writing, since the extrinsic evidence designed to be kept from the
jury by the PER must be taken into account on that issue. It is,
however, a question of fact, upon which all relevant evidence is
admissible.'56
Finality is for the most part a relatively simple matter.'57
Although acknowledged as "the first crucial question in most parol
evidence rule disputes,"'5 8 it is rarely litigated as a separate issue.'59
When the controversy focuses upon completeness, finality may seem
obvious to everyone and is thus often conceded or assumed. Because
finality is linked with completeness in the test to exclude
supplementary evidence, there is a tendency to pair the two all the
time. Doing so suggests that the PER answers both issues. Such an
assumption leaves the PER wide open to abuse and opportunism.
152. See Cananwill, 250 B.R. at 548; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209
cmt. c (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 228 cmt. a (1932). The Restatement test

gives effect to an appearance of "completeness and specificity," but it gives way to other
evidence establishing a lack of finality. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 209(3) (1981).
153. In Cananwill the merger clause was ineffective to negate the parties' intentions, as
demonstrated by their prior words of agreement as well as their conduct, indicating that
other terms would apply to their insurance contract and clearly establishing that the
writing was not final. See Cananwill. 250 B.R. at 548; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 209(3) (1981) (describing circumstances in which appearance of
completeness may lead to a writing's being "taken to be an integrated agreement").
154. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 18, at 336.
155. See Cananwill, 250 B.R. at 546-49.

156. See id. at 548.
157. There is some controversy associated with the test for contradiction, however, as
is indicated below in text. See infra Part IV.B.1.c.

158. Mooney, supra note 20, at 384.
159. See id. at 383 ("[S]o few courts examine seriously the first, 'integrated at all'
issue ...").
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Conflating finality with completeness invites courts to treat them
together as conclusions of law. It makes a great deal of difference, for
finality should be sought in all the evidence without limitation from
the PER. It also encourages a sort of judicial reflex to protect

anything in writing, insulating the scantiest, sketchiest, most
incidental writing and
agreement.

rendering nugatory

the parties'

actual

It is perhaps symptomatic of fundamental misconceptions about
the nature of the PER that the issue of finality, as rarely as it
ordinarily comes up, has reached appellate courts repeatedly in North
Carolina in recent years. It is rarely identified and addressed

coherently.
Contemporaneous oral agreements, where no fraud is involved,
often raise finality issues. An example is Capps v. NW Sign Industries
160 In Capps, the defendants alleged
of North Carolina.
that they had
signed what they thought was only a key-points summary following a
mediated settlement agreement, relying upon the mediator's alleged
promise that a settlement agreement including a confidentiality
agreement "with teeth"16' 1 would be executed afterwards. What was
signed was only five sentences long,162 leaving out many details.163
160. No. COA06-1297, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1816, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 21,
2007).
161. In other words, conditioning payments over time upon the employee's silence. Id.
at *4.
162. Id. at *17-18. The signed settlement agreement provided:
1. [Defendants] agree to offer and ...[plaintiff] agrees to accept the sum of
$124,000 in full and final settlement of all claims;
2. The parties agree that they shall execute mutual dismissal of all claims against
each other and counsel for the parties shall withdraw any existing appeals;
3. The parties agree that the terms of this settlement are confidential and the
parties further agree that if asked they will represent that this matter was resolved
to the mutual satisfaction of all parties; and
4. The parties shall bear their own costs.
Id.
163. Id. at *19-20. Defendants pointed out that it
does not contain any schedule of payment, does not state whether the
contemplated settlement proceeds are to be paid in a lump sum or over time, does
not state when the payment is due, does not state where or how the payment is to
be made, does not provide for full releases of the parties, their agents, successors
and assigns, ... does not contain any enforcement mechanism for the summary
language that does exist

.. .

about confidentiality of the settlement ...[and] does

not provide for disclosure of the amount of the settlement to the parties'

2009]

PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

1731

The defendants apparently expressed doubt about the finality of so
brief a settlement agreement by inartfully using the word
"ambiguous." 1"
This led the court completely off the subject,
provoking the observation that neither brevity nor the omission of
terms necessarily creates ambiguity.'65 It seems likely that the case
may, rest, at least in part, upon doubts about the credibility of
defendants' contentions, given the emphasis that the court gives to
deficiencies in the record on appeal. 66 The PER, however, is not a
tool to take credibility issues from the jury outside the context of a
final writing.'67
In view of its astonishing brevity and summary nature, the signed
agreement in Capps should not have been given the effect of a final
writing. If the context of mediated settlement raises a customary rule
of finality, there is no allusion to it. The prompt spate of e-mails sent
by defendant in an apparent effort to secure a negotiated contract
following the settlement seems strongly supportive of its contention
6
that the settlement agreement was only a key-points settlement. 1
When finality was challenged, the tenor of the court's response in
Capps suggests that every writing is final as a matter of law. There is
a good deal of evidence suggesting that the court regards the PER as
applying whenever there is any writing at all, without examining its
qualification as "the contract" or looking into its finality. 69 This is a
accountants, CPAs and other professionals that will need the settlement amount to
prepare the parties' taxes and provide other financial services.
Id.
164. Id. at *19.
165. See id. at *20-21.
166. See id. at *22-23. The court held that the record's inadequacy cost defendants the
opportunity to rely upon a recognized PER exception for mode of payment and discharge.
See id. at *21-23 (citing Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Morehead, 209 N.C. 174, 176,
183 S.E. 606,607 (1936)).
167. The PER applies only when the parties have intended to reduce their agreement
to a final writing. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
168. See Capps, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1816, at *19.
169. See, e.g., Root v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272 N.C. 580, 587, 158 S.E.2d 829, 835 (1968)
("The general rule is that when a written instrument is introduced into evidence, its terms
may not be contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence, and it is presumed that all prior
negotiations are merged into the written instrument." (citing Fox v. S. Appliances, Inc.,
264 N.C. 267, 270, 141 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1965))); Barger v. Krimminger, 262 N.C. 596, 598,
138 S.E.2d 207, 209 (1964) (per curiam); Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Morehead, 209
N.C. 174, 175, 183 S.E. 606,607 (1936) ("It is well-nigh axiomatic that no verbal agreement
between the parties to a written contract, made before or at the time of the execution of
such, is admissible to vary its terms or to contradict its provisions. As against the
recollection of the parties, whose memories may fail them, the written word abides. The
rule undoubtedly makes for the sanctity and security of contracts.") (internal citations
omitted).
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startling and dangerous development and one of
which Williston
7
would have disapproved as vehemently as Corbin.1 1
One likely reason for the failure to recognize the importance of
the factual issues involved in the judicial inquiry as to the presence of
a final writing is that the courts reflexively couple finality with
completeness, becoming blind to the critical distinction between
71
them. This tendency is observable in Rowe v. Rowe:1
[T]he rule is intended to apply only to final, totally integrated
writings; that is, those writings relating to a transaction which
are intended to supersede all other agreements regarding that
transaction. If the writing supersedes only a part of the
transaction, it is a partial integration and other
portions of the
72
transaction may be shown by parol evidence.1
The Rowe quotation suggests that finality and completeness are
properly handled together and from a retrospective focus upon the
issue of the writing's having superseded another. The suggestion is
misleading, in part because finality looks not only backward to see
whether the writing puts a cap on what has gone before, but also
forward to whether something yet to come is anticipated. Being the
condition of the rule's application, finality must be decided first,
without the evidentiary strictures that are imposed by the PER.
To similar effect is Bost v. Bost,'7 3 which sets out a rule designed
to clarify the law:
It is a well established rule of evidence and of substantive law
that matters resting in parol leading up to the execution of a
written contract are considered as varied by and merged in the
written instrument.... [T]he parties, when they reduce their
contract to writing, are presumed to have inserted in it all the
provisions by which they intend to be bound. "The writing is
conclusive as to the terms of the bargain." Applying this rule to
the instant case, the partiesare presumed to have integrated their
negotiations and agreements into the written memorial
embodying the unequivocal
terms and conditions of their
74
separation agreement.

170. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
171. 305 N.C. 177, 287 S.E.2d 840 (1982).
172. Id. at 185, 287 S.E.2d at 845 (citing 2 STANSBURY, supra note 26, § 251) (emphasis
added).
173. 234 N.C. 554, 67 S.E.2d 745 (1951).
174. Id. at 557, 67 S.E.2d at 747 (quoting Williams v. McLean, 220 N.C. 504, 506, 17
S.E.2d 644, 646 (1941)) (emphasis added).
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The phrase "when they reduce their contract to writing"
acknowledges that a writing is required. 175 This issue is related to, but
quite different from the question of the parties' intention that the
writing be their final expression of agreement as to one or more of its
terms.
Although Bost, which involves a separation agreement providing
for release and relinquishment of property rights, probably reaches
the right result, its language, as quoted above, would spell disaster for
such skeletal memoranda as were used in Johnson and in Capps.
Nothing in Bost shows that finality is a matter of intent to be
determined from the facts by the court. Nothing separates finality
from the issue of completeness, an issue the court answered in the
affirmative.176
Another example of a failure to appreciate the nature and
significance of the finality issue is Mayo v. North Carolina State
University,'77 in which the court applied the PER to prevent North
Carolina State University from asserting an unwritten policy relating
to the university's July 1 fiscal year.'78 The university sought to
garnish a tenured professor's salary to recover summer salary paid
after his resignation had been accepted. 179 The court recited
testimony that "petitioner's employment agreement consisted only of
his appointment letter, his annual salary letter, and the policies
adopted and amended by the UNC Board of Governors and by the
NCSU Board of Trustees."' 8 ° From this, the court drew its conclusion
about finality without further discussion: "It therefore appears the
parties intended the above documents to be the final integration of
18
the employment agreement. '

175. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
176. Fortunately, when it has cited Bost, the court has done so in terms that clarify its
significance, choosing that part of the opinion that emphasizes the unique context in which
the words appear. In Lane v. Scarborough,284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973), the court
intimates an intention to limit Bost to its context. Id. at 411, 200 S.E.2d at 625 ("We also
point out that the 'term separation and property settlement agreement' in the absence of
clear language or impelling implications connotes not only complete and permanent
cessation of marital relations, but a full and final settlement of all property rights of every
kind and character." (quoting Bost, 234 N.C. at 557, 67 S.E.2d at 747)).
177. 168 N.C. App. 508, 608 S.E.2d 116 (2005), affd per curiam, 360 N.C. 52, 619
S.E.2d 502 (2005).
178. Id. at 510, 608 S.E.2d at 122.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 509, 608 S.E.2d at 121-22. There were actually a series of appointment
letters as his career progressed. See id. at 508 n.2, 608 S.E.2d at 121 n.2.
181. Id. at 509-10, 608 S.E.2d at 122.
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However, although the court may look to all relevant evidence
for the parties' intention of finality, one need go no further in Mayo
than the writings themselves to reach the opposite conclusion from
the court's. The writings reveal with clarity that they cannot be
regarded as final expressions of intent even upon the narrow issue of
compensation and its associated policies. The writings represent a
dynamic agreement in which change is expected and provided for.
For one thing, the parties expressly contemplate a new salary letter
each year. 8 2 The successive appointment letters no doubt were
expected as well, in connection with each event of tenure and
promotion.' 83 Even more significant is the express provision in each
appointment letter making the professor's employment "subject to all
policies adopted and amended by the UNC Board of Governors and
'
by the NCSU Board of Trustees. '""l
This language seems to
contemplate the contract terms' continual adjustment as new policies
are adopted or existing policies modified by the university's
governing bodies.
The deficiencies of the state courts' approach to finality become
clearer upon comparison with the federal court's methodology,
applying state law, in Cananwill, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc.'8 5 In
Cananwill, an insurer agreed to provide workers' compensation
insurance for the bankrupt.186
An initial agreement specified
retrospectively rated terms, a more expensive insurance in which the
premium is based upon claims paid."8 This original intention never
changed, despite issuance of a standard policy including the less
expensive version. When the insurer later sent a Premium Deferral
Agreement, the insured failed to sign it only because of minor
quibbles unrelated to the retrospective terms. 188 Upon the insured's
bankruptcy, however, the trustee sought to recover the excess
premiums.
Considering all the relevant evidence, the court in
Cananwill found the formal standard contract not to be intended as
final: both parties expected the terms to be retrospective.' 89 The
court said: "A court initially must determine whether the writing was

182. See id. at 506, 608 S.E.2d at 119.
183. See id. at 508 n.2, 608 S.E.2d at 121 n.2.
184. Id. at 506, 608 S.E.2d at 119.
185. 250 B.R. 533 (M.D.N.C. 1999).

186. Id. at 537.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 538. Insured's Director of Risk Management testified to that effect, noting
that such circumstances were commonplace and of no concern to anyone. Id.
189. Id. at 548.
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'integrated.' Only findings of integration [finality] will implicate the
parol evidence rule ....
When it is found that the requisite reduction to writing has
occurred and that the parties have intended one or more of the
written terms as final, the PER may be applied to bar certain extrinsic
terms. The pool of extrinsic evidence eligible to be excluded by the
rule includes all agreements made prior to the final writing, whether
the prior agreements were oral or written, and oral agreements that
were made contemporaneously with the writing. It is important at
this stage to distinguish the effect of finality from that of
completeness of the writing.
c.
The Effect of Finality: Exclusion of ContradictoryExtrinsic
Terms
When a writing is intended to be final, its effect under the PER is
to bar contradictory extrinsic terms or, in other words, terms that are
inconsistent with the final written contract.191 In North Carolina, the
rule is that the test of inconsistency is made by comparison with the
express terms of the written contract.'92 In 1932, observing North
Carolina's abandonment of the PER, Chadbourn and McCormick
noted an exception "in cases of contradiction," by which, they said,
the North Carolina courts meant " 'total inconsistency' between the
alleged oral transaction and the writing." '93
To the extent that the holding of Bost v. Bost 94 rests upon
contradiction, 95 it does not depart from the "total inconsistency"
190. Id. at 547 (quoting Smith v. Cent. Soya of Athens, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 518, 524
(E.D.N.C. 1985)).
191.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS § 213(1) (1981); RESTATEMENT OF

CONTRACTS § 237 (1932). See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., N.C. Nat'l Bank v. Gillespie, 291 N.C. 303, 308, 230 S.E.2d 375, 378

(1976) (applying, among other exceptions, a rule allowing a whole contract to be proven
where only part is in writing, as long as there is no general writing requirement and the
extrinsic evidence is not contradictory); Lancaster v. Lancaster, 138 N.C. App. 459, 466,
530 S.E.2d 82, 86-87 (2000) (barring the wife's evidence that she and her husband actually
agreed to terms other than those in the separation agreement).

193. Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at 158-59.
194. 234 N.C. 554, 67 S.E.2d 745 (1951).

195. The court's reasoning is not altogether clear, for it combines language relating to
completeness with that applicable to finality. This makes it difficult to pinpoint whether

the proffered evidence violates the rule by supplementing an already complete contract or
by contradicting one that is merely final.

Supplementation seems to be the point of

barring a promise "to do something beyond the plain words and meaning of [the] written
contract." Id. at 558, 67 S.E.2d at 747. However, as the text indicates, contradiction seems
to play an important part as well, although the difference is subtle. See id. at 557, 67
S.E.2d at 747. Since the court clearly considers the separation agreement to be complete
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standard above. The wife in Bost sought to prove a prior oral
agreement giving her an interest in her husband's company with a
right to proceeds from its sale.'96 The court said, "The term
'separation and property settlement agreement' in the absence of
clear language or impelling implications connotes not only complete
and permanent cessation of marital relations, but a full and final
settlement of all property rights of every kind and character."1 97 It
found the oral agreement to be "in direct contravention of the written
instruments by the terms of which she released and relinquished to
her husband all property rights."' 198 Adding additional property to
that provided by the written contract would "vary its terms,"1 99
contradicting the contextual connotation of completeness that is the
very nature of the "separation and property settlement agreement."2 °'
The court's holding in Bost was premised upon its experienced
appreciation of the meaning of a particular kind of agreement. The
extrinsic agreement was compared to the express terms as used in the
particular context of a separation agreement; this is not a test based
on what the writing looks like, its facial appearance of completeness,
nor is it a test of consistency with gapfillers implied by law. The same
approach is taken in Lane v. Scarborough,"' an interpretation case
that quotes Bost.2" 2
However, there are also some cases that do test contradiction not
only against the writing's express terms but also against terms implied
by law. As a matter of policy, both Williston and Corbin agreed that
a term implied by law should never trump one to which the parties
have actually agreed.2"3 Chadbourn and McCormick cited a time-ofperformance term as the "classic case" illustrating implication by
operation of law. 2" The notion that an extrinsic agreement should be
disallowed when a reasonable time has been implied, said the
distinguished authors, is understood to be at odds with the parties'
as well as final, the prior oral agreement offered by the wife is objectionable on both
grounds. See id. at 558, 67 S.E.2d at 747.
196. Id. at 557, 67 S.E.2d at 747.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973) (using the nature of separation agreements to
interpret the intent of the parties when forming the agreement).
202. Id. at 411, 200 S.E.2d at 625.
203. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 593; 2 WILLISTON, supra note 3, §§ 615, 640; Helen
Hadjiyannakis, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The Sounds of Silence, 54
FORDHAM L. REV. 35 passim (1985).

204. Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at 166.
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intentions "for the simple reason that in most cases the transacting
parties will not know of such a rule. 2 ° They backed up this assertion
by noting that "Williston's incisive argument has successfully
exploded the notion that rules of law are always to be considered a
part of the contract of the parties based on their presumed intention
to include them. '2 6 The debate whether extrinsic evidence should be
tested for consistency against terms implied by law is a pressing issue
in North Carolina, properly falling under the heading of finality.
Even if the writing in Johnson v. Honeycutt"' were held to be a
final writing sufficient to invoke the PER, the extrinsic term of a pickup date for the truck bed is supplementary to the writing, not
contradictory. 2 8 The pick-up date sought to be proven by the seller
does not contradict any express terms of the agreement, nor is there
any reason to believe that the parties actually contracted by reference
to the "reasonable time" term implied by law so as to make a
Testing contradiction
different agreement actually inconsistent.
against terms implied by law would render unnecessary any finding of
completeness in most cases, since a great many holes in a writing
could be filled by implied terms prior to testing for contradiction.
That is especially true in a Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) case
like Johnson2 9 because of the liberal gapfillers provided in Part 3 of
Article 2 of the U.C.C. and for which section 25-2-204(3) of the
General Statutes of North Carolina makes ample provision.210

205. Id. at 167.
206. Id. at 166 ("To assume first that everybody knows the law, and second, that
everyone thereupon makes his contract with reference to it and adopts its provisions as
terms of the agreement, is indeed to pile a fiction upon a fiction, and certainly without any
necessity, for where different conclusions are reached by means of the fiction than would
be reached without it, they are not preferable to the opposite ones.... Doubtless, law
frequently is adopted by the parties as a portion of their agreement. Whether it is or not
in any particular case, should be determined by the same standard of interpretation as is
applied to their expressions in other respects." (quoting 2 WILLISTON, supra note 3,

§ 615)).
207. No. COA05-295, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 249 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2006). The
case is discussed above. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
208. The writing provided: " '1 16 Ft Virginian Dump Bed, Wet line, Pump Hoist &
Console. Sold to James Johnson for $2500.00. Paid check.' " Johnson, 2006 N.C. App
LEXIS at *2.
209. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (discussing reduction to writing as
a requirement for application of the PER); see also infra note 258 and accompanying text
(discussing the presumption of completeness).
210. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-204(3) (2007) ("Even though one or more terms are left
open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to
make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy.").
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Moreover, Johnson is not alone, for the state supreme court
reached a similar conclusion almost sixty years ago in McKay v.
Cameron."21 It seems unlikely, nevertheless, that the court sitting
today would be inclined to approve these cases.
Once the PER has been invoked by the court's finding a certain
kind of writing that is intended by the parties as their final expression
of agreement as to one or more contract terms, the exclusion of
contradictory evidence is the rule's first effect. It is not, however, its
last or its most awesome effect. A court that proceeds to a finding of
completeness goes on to exclude extrinsic supplementary evidence
that violates no term of the writing, but is perfectly compatible with it.
This goes far beyond prohibiting contradiction, for it negates terms
actually agreed upon that are textually unobjectionable by reference
to the writing itself. The exclusion rests upon a legal presumption
that is the PER's more striking and dangerous effect. Completeness,
unlike finality, may have no real connection to the parties' actual
intentions. The rule itself governs the decision whether the writing is
complete, making the test for completeness the principal
battleground for the rule's proponents and its detractors.
2. Completeness
22

is referred to in the language of the Restatements
Completeness
as "whole '' 21 or "complete integration. 2 14 Whether a writing is
complete is an issue that follows sequentially from the identification
of a final written contract. When the issue of completeness is taken
up by a court, finality of the written contract has already barred
contradictory extrinsic terms. 2 5 A finding of completeness also bars
supplementary extrinsic terms. 1 6 As a general matter, the issue of
completeness is for the court; whether and to what degree it involves

211. 231 N.C. 658, 661, 58 S.E.2d 638, 639 (1950).
212. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
213.

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1932).

214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210 cmt. 1 (1981).
215. A reminder is useful here, that "extrinsic terms" in this Article means terms

coming from any prior agreement, whether written or oral, and oral agreements made
contemporaneously

with the writing.

See supra note 63 and accompanying text

(explaining extrinsic terms).
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213(2) (1981); RESTATEMENT OF

CONTRACTS § 237 (1932). If the writing is found ambiguous (under the widely applied
general rule), extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret or construe it. See supra note 72
and accompanying text (discussing interpretation).
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factual determinations depends upon whether the court hews more
closely to the position of Williston or Corbin.217
Because finality has already caused the PER to be invoked
before the writing is tested for completeness, it is possible for courts
to derive the test for completeness from the rule itself in a sort of
bootstrapping methodology that Corbin disliked and Williston
embraced. The vehemence of their opposite feelings cannot possibly
be overstated. Corbin insisted that all relevant evidence should be
brought to bear upon the issue of completeness, including, for
example, the credibility of the extrinsic agreement, the parties'
situations, purposes, negotiations, prior dealings, course of
performance if any, commercial context, etc.2" 8 The point of the quest
for Corbin was to enforce the parties' real mutual intentions." 9
Williston, on the other hand, sought to enhance the certainty and
predictability of the written word.2 From his standpoint, the parties'
intentions should ideally be discernible from the writing itself as a
matter of law, allowing the writing to prove itself complete without
anything more than a peek at the extrinsic agreement in order to
determine whether the final writing reasonably appeared to cover
22
it. '

In contrast to their neglect of the finality issue, North Carolina
cases do explicitly address completeness prior to determining the
admissibility of a prior agreement. If it was ever true, as was claimed
by Dalzell, that the courts of the state simply tested for credibility of
the extrinsic agreement and then admitted it,222 it is so no longer.
There is a substantial group of hard PER cases that determine
completeness primarily by the appearance or even the mere presence
of a writing. Their analysis does not seem to turn upon any particular
formula's being recited. Most, though not all, of these hard cases are
devoid of anything resembling the careful factual analysis found in
217. Although the extrinsic evidence is meant to be kept from the jury, there is good
reason to allow the jury to determine a contested issue of fact involved in the
determination of completeness if it does not violate that principle.
218. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list.
219. Corbin's position is evident throughout his treatise's discussion of the PER. See 3
CORBIN, supra note 3, §§ 573-96. As Calamari & Perillo say, "[w]hen Professor Corbin
speaks of the intent of the parties he emphatically means their actual expressed intent."
Calamari & Perillo, supra note 18, at 339.
220. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 633. Williston's methodology for determining
what he called "intent" with regard to a written contract that is both final and complete is
set out in Calamari & Perillo. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 18, at 338-39.
221. Cf. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 18, at 388 (describing Williston's strict
adherence to the writing itself).
222. See Dalzell, supra note 7, at 428.
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the landmark cases from other jurisdictions that are generally cited to
exemplify the Willistonian methodology.22 3 The North Carolina
analysis of the completeness issue is characteristically confusing and
conclusory, marked by formulaic recitals of strings of quoted
fragments of the rule.
Mayo v. North Carolina State University,22 4 discussed above for
its finality issue,"' is an illustrative example for completeness analysis
as well. The Mayo court held that North Carolina State University
could not garnish a professor's salary to recoup an overpayment after
his announced resignation from the faculty; the policy depended upon
by the university was barred by the PER.226
The opinion is confusing, leaping from one issue to another

without transition. The court began with what seems to suggest that
the issue was construction or interpretation of the contract:227
With all contracts, the goal of construction is to arrive at the
intent of the parties when the contract was issued. The intent
of the parties may be derived from the language in the contract.
When the contract language is unambiguous, our courts have a
duty to construe and enforce the contract as written, without
disregarding the express language used. However, if a contract
contains language which is ambiguous, a factual question exists,
which must be resolved by the trier of fact.228
However, the court showed no concern about the meaning of the
contract;229 instead, it seemed to focus upon the "plain meaning

223. A comparison of North Carolina case law to New York's Mitchell v. Lath, 160
N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928) or Pennsylvania's Gianni v. R. Russell & Co., 126 A. 791 (Pa. 1924) is
instructive.
224. 168 N.C. App. 508, 608 S.E.2d 116 (2005), affd per curiam, 360 N.C. 52, 619
S.E.2d 502 (2005).
225. See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
226. Mayo, 168 N.C. App. at 509-10, 608 S.E.2d at 121-22.
227. Id. at 508, 608 S.E.2d at 120. The court moved from interpretation immediately to
the requirement of certainty and specificity for an employment contract, recognizing
compensation as an essential term and leading Judge Hunter in his dissent to characterize
the majority as holding that the contract fails for lack of certainty. Id. at 511. 608 S.E.2d at
122 (Hunter, J.,dissenting). However, the PER bar, which immediately precedes the
majority's ruling against any debt owed by the professor to the university, seems to have
been at the heart of the majority's opinion. Id. at 509-10. 608 S.E.2d at 121-22 (majority
opinion).
228. Id. at 508, 608 S.E.2d at 120 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
229. See id. at 508, 608 S.E.2d at 121. No facts indicate any doubt about the meaning of
the agreement and the court's conclusion that the agreement is clear and unambiguous
simply recites the payment terms found in the writings. Id.
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rule ' 230 commonly applied where the meaning of contract terms was
at issue. In contrast to the PER itself, traditionally soft in North
Carolina, although often confusingly worded, this rule of
interpretation is a hard one, at least on its face.231 The plain meaning
rule is a Willistonian rule, one that relies upon the writing to prove
itself. This analytical sidestep might refocus the court upon the words
of the writing, which the court will "construe and enforce as written,"
except that there is no alternative interpretation or construction
involved.
Focusing upon the perceived necessity to exclude the offending
policy, the court may have cited interpretation cases inadvertently.
The invulnerability of the "unambiguous" written term to a different
meaning may be a stand-in for the bar of contradictory extrinsic terms
that results from a final written contract. The fragments of the rule
that the court strung together from several different sources may
simply fail to represent a coherent framework for PER analysis. That
bodes ill for future cases.
A page later, having found in a footnote that the writing was a
' the court returned
"full integration of the employment agreement,"232
to the PER, which it set out:
"The parol evidence rule prohibits the admission of parol
evidence to vary, add to, or contradict a written instrument
intended to be the final integration of the transaction." "The
rule is otherwise where it is shown that the writing is not a full
integration of the terms of the contract," or "[w]hen a contract
230. Enforcing the contract as written, as the quoted passage requires for unambiguous
contracts, enforces the "plain" or "clear" meaning of the agreement, consistent with the
so-called "plain meaning rule." The latter is less a "rule" than a method of interpretation

that emphasizes the common meaning of words with as little attention as possible to
context. It is generally applied without definition, apparently upon the assumption that it
has its own "plain meaning." For example, Eric Posner never defines the "plain meaning
rule" in his eponymous article The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation. See Posner, supra note 2. at 540. An economic

variant of a definition is supplied by Avery Wiener Katz: "[F]or a given audience or
interpreter, plain meaning corresponds to the interpretation associated with the
interpreter's ordinary or zero-cost context-that is, the context that the interpreter can
apply with minimal work." Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in

Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 496, 521 (2004). For the conventional use of
"plain" and "clear" together or as synonyms, see 3 CORBIN, supra notc 3. § 542 (noting

that some context is required to find language "plain and clear").
231. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.i. As the cases gathered in Part IV.B.2.b.i. suggest, the
application of the "plain meaning" rule in North Carolina is often nuanced: it can be
softened as the context requires. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.iii.
232. Mayo, 168 N.C. App. at 509 n.2. 608 S.E.2d at 121 n.2. The discussion above notes
the inadequacy of the court's analysis of finality. See supra Part IV.B.I.a.
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is ambiguous, parol evidence is admissible
to show and make
23 3
certain the intention behind the contract.
This statement of the PER suffers from the discontinuity that
comes from a string of quotations strung together from different
sources without adequate connection. Substantively, the quoted rule
is commendable in referring to "a written instrument intended to be
the final integration," but the court does not follow up by actually
conducting the necessary factual inquiry, as is indicated above in the
discussion of finality. Furthermore, Mayo purports to bar proof not
only of contradiction, but also of additional extrinsic terms upon
finality alone.2 ' To render consistent extrinsic terms inadmissible
requires more than finality; it rests upon completeness, a "total" or
"complete" integration.
The second sentence quoted above says, "[t]he rule is otherwise
where it is shown that the writing is not a full integration. 2 3 5 This
fails to indicate in what regard the rule is "otherwise." Is the PER
not applicable at all? Does the integrated writing bar extrinsic
evidence for some purposes, but not others? Where is the evidence
of completeness? The words change the effect of the rule "where it is
shown that the writing is not a full integration"; this must mean that
the party seeking to introduce the extrinsic evidence bears the burden
of proving incompleteness. This, then, is another indication that the
court is applying a rule modeled upon Williston's, by which a writing
proves itself to be "intended" as the final and complete expression of
the parties' agreement. There is nothing in the case, however, that
prevents the PER's attaching itself to any and every writing
indiscriminately.
A further word is useful about the PER formula recited in Mayo,
barring extrinsic evidence to "vary, add to, or contradict" the written
contract. It is identical to that which inspired a droll comment from
Chadbourn and McCormick: "The oral agreement will always add to
or vary the writing. If it does not there is no necessity for proving it.

233. Mayo, 168 N.C. App. at 509, 608 S.E.2d at 121 (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted) (first quoting Hall v. Hotel L'Europe, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 664, 666, 318
S.E.2d 99, 101 (1984) then quoting Vestal v. Vestal, 49 N.C. App. 263, 266, 271 S.E.2d 306,
308 (1980) then quoting Dockery v. Quality Plastic Custom Molding, Inc., 144 N.C. App.
419, 422, 547 S.E.2d 850, 852-3 (2001)).
234. See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
235. The same language is found in Craig v. Kessing, 297 N.C. 32, 35, 253 S.E.2d 264,
265-66 (1979).

2009]

PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

1743

This fallacy is doubtless produced by the thoughtless repetition of the
236
traditional phraseology of the rule.,
a.

Completeness by Presumption

In the decades since Dalzell wrote in 1955, North Carolina courts
have given heavy weight to superficial aspects of written agreements,
no doubt in order to avoid submitting factual issues to a jury. They
have elevated writings to a final and complete expression of the
parties' agreement by applying presumptions of the parties'
intentions, sometimes acknowledging the presumption explicitly and
at other times, not, as seems to be the case in Mayo v. North Carolina
State University.237 A presumption methodology uncoupled from the
facts yields inconsistent results, especially when it is applied without
first establishing finality.
Perhaps the original version of the North Carolina presumption
may be traced to 1810, when, in Smith v. Williams,238 the court posed
to itself the PER issue: "Whether oral evidence is proper to extend
and enlarge a contract which the parties have committed to
writing? ' 239 The court answered itself as follows:
The first reflection that occurs to the mind upon the statement
of the question, independent of any technical rules, is, that the
parties, by making a written memorial of their transaction, have
implicitly agreed, that in the event of any future
misunderstanding, that writing shall be referred to, as the proof
of their act and intention: that such obligations as arose from
the paper, by just construction or legal intendment, should be
valid and compulsory on them; but that they would not subject
themselves to any stipulations beyond their contract; because, if
they meant to be bound by any such, they might have added
them to the writing; and thus have given them a clearness, a
force, and a direction, which they could not have by being
trusted to the memory of a witness.24 °
The quoted passage reveals the basis and import of the
presumption, which is an implicit agreement to be bound by the
meaning attributed by the court to the writing and by no terms
236.
237.
S.E.2d
238.

Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at 154.
168 N.C. App. 508, 608 S.E.2d 116 (2005), affd per curiam, 360 N.C. 52, 619
502 (2005). See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 426 (1810). The case is discussed supra at notes 46-56 and in the

accompanying text.
239. Id. at 430.

240. Id. at 430-31.
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outside it. The implicit agreement spoken of by the court does not
arise from the facts of the transaction, but solely from the writing
itself.2 41 That it is an agreement born of judicial mandate rather than
the buyer's manifested intention is very clear because the oral
assurance was made at the same time as the writing,2 42 negating any
concerns about superseding terms. The account of a disinterested
witness who overheard the warranty matches the buyer's,24 3 so that
the there were also no concerns about credibility. It is beyond
imagination that the court accurately described the buyer's intentions
as being reflected in the "implicit agreement."
Thus, the "implicit agreement" in Smith is implied by law and
arises in large part from the instinctive impulse of the judge to elevate
written over oral terms. Not least in its attributes is that the meaning
and legal import of the writing is a matter for the court, not the jury.
Smith v. Williams does not establish what kind of writing triggers the
presumption; although the court focuses upon the nature of the
writing that gives rise to such legal consequences, the distinction to be
drawn is between a sealed "specialty" and an ordinary signed
writing.244 It does not provide much guidance to modern courts.
Probably the most widely cited version2 45 is found in Neal v.
246
Marrone:
A contract not required to be in writing may be partly written
and partly oral. However, where the parties have deliberately
put their engagements in writing in such terms as import a legal
obligation free of uncertainty, it is presumed the writing was
intended by the parties to represent all their engagements as to
the elements dealt with in the writing. Accordingly, all prior
and contemporaneous negotiations in respect to those elements
are deemed merged in the written agreement. And the rule is
that, in the absence of fraud or mistake or allegation thereof,
parol testimony of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or
conversations inconsistent with the writing, or which tend to
substitute a new and different contract from the one evidenced
by the writing, is incompetent.24 7

241. Id.
242. See id. at 431.

243. Id.
244. Id. at 429.
245. The presumption's popularity may be due in part to its having been quoted at
length with some approval in 2 STANSBURY, supra note 26, § 253.
246. 239 N.C. 73, 79 S.E.2d 239 (1953).
247. Id. at 77, 79 S.E.2d at 242.
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The presumption follows the deliberate reduction to writing of
contract terms, but it poses a great many questions: (1) whether the
presumption requires a final writing or presumes it; (2) whether it
applies to a writing that is final with regard to fewer than all the terms
of the contract; (3) how broad or narrow is the language giving the
presumption's effect to "all their engagements as to the elements
dealt with in the writing"; (4) why and to what effect is the issue of
interpretation (e.g., uncertainty) included in the rule; (5) what is
meant by "substitute a new and different contract"; (6) what is the
relationship of this sentence to the PER set out at the end of the
quoted passage: "Accordingly, all prior and contemporaneous
negotiations in respect to those elements are deemed merged in the
written agreement."
A disturbing oddity in the Neal v. Marrone rule is that it
apparently bars extrinsic, noncontradictory evidence by the
presumption of having been "intended by the parties to represent
their engagements as to the elements" in the writing. This apparent
expansion of the effect of finality comes close to making a separate
little PER for each contract term, treating it as complete and perhaps
barring anything within its scope. Ordinarily, if found merely final
but not complete, the contract would be treated as one entirety, with
consistent additional terms admissible, no matter how closely related
they are to the written ones. Thus, terms would be admissible that
would further the written objectives or provide a richer context, for
example, to inform expectation or enhance certainty for purposes of
damages.
Although the court later clarified and corrected Neal v. Marrone
in Craig v. Kessing,248 the correction in Craig is contextual, having to
do with an alleged alteration of the writing after signing.2 49 Few PER
cases involve similar facts, so the explanation has little application in
ordinary use. In fact, the language in Craig that does speak to the
usual PER case creates a new problem by purporting to limit the
rule's application to writings that are final and complete (totally or
completely integrated).2 5 ° The suggestion has the authority of long
248. 297 N.C. 32,253 S.E.2d 264 (1979).
249. Id. at 34-35, 253 S.E.2d at 265 (1979).
250. See id. at 34, 253 S.E.2d at 265-66. The court in Craigsaid of Neal's presumption,

Furthermore, it does not adequately explain why evidence of the particular terms
in question is inadmissible under the partial integration theory.
It appears to be well settled in this jurisdiction that parol testimony of prior or

contemporaneous negotiations or conversations

inconsistent with a written
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precedent, as far back at least as 1906,1' but like virtually all the

North Carolina fragmentary versions, has never proven helpful. It
may be fortunate that the correction in Craig is often ignored.
In Root v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"'2 considering whether a lease

included the basement, the court said, "[t]he general rule is that when
a written instrument is introduced into evidence, its terms may not be
contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence, and it is presumed that all

'
prior negotiations are merged into the written instrument."253

However, Justice Branch insulated the presumption within a nest of

more carefully drawn tests. He immediately noted as a "modification
' that
of the above stated rule"254
[t]he legal effect of a final instrument which defines and
declares the intentions and rights of the parties cannot be
modified or corrected by proof of any preliminary negotiations

or agreement, nor is it permissible to show how the parties
understood the transaction in order to explain or qualify what is

in the final writing, in the absence of an allegation of fraud or
mistake or unless the terms of the instrument itself are
25 5
ambiguous and require explanation.
Judge Branch added:
It is a well-established general rule that if the parties reduce

their entire contract or agreement to writing, whether under
seal or not, the court will not hear parol evidence to vary or
change it, unless for fraud, mistake or the like; but if it appear

that the entire agreement was not reduced to writing, or if the
writing itself leaves it doubtful or uncertain as to what the

agreement was, parol evidence is competent, not to contradict,
but to show and make certain what was the real agreement

contract entered into between the parties, or which tends to substitute a new or
different contract for the one evidenced by the writing, is incompetent. This rule
applies where the writing totally integrates all the terms of a contract or
supersedes all other agreements relating to the transaction. The rule is otherwise
where it is shown that the writing is not a full integration of the terms of the
contract. The terms not included in the writing may then be shown by parol.
Id. at 34-35, 253 S.E.2d at 265-66 (internal citations omitted).
251. See Evans v. Freeman, 142 N.C. 61, 64-65, 54 S.E. 847, 848 (1906).
252. 272 N.C. 580, 158 S.E.2d 829 (1968).
253. Id. at 587, 158 S.E.2d at 832.
254. Id. at 587, 158 S.E.2d at 835.
255. Id. (quoting Orion Knitting Mills v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 137 N.C. 565, 569, 50
S.E. 304, 305 (1905)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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between the parties, and, in such a case, what was meant, is for
the jury, under proper instructions from the court. 56
Although the presumption would be less destructive of party
intentions if courts generally took such care, it adds nothing to the
analysis and operates like a legal version of an attractive nuisance,
luring courts into error.
It is indicative of the deficiencies of the presumption
methodology that it must be discussed here as a separate matter,
appearing like an ill-fitting undergarment between the conventional
PER topics of finality and completeness. However, the confusing
interweaving of the two issues is not peculiar to North Carolina. In
fact, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts executes what feels like a
backwards march, providing for a finding of finality based upon the
appearance of a writing's completeness: "Where the parties reduce an
agreement to a writing which in view of its completeness and
specificity reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, it is taken
to be an integrated agreement unless it is established by other
25 7
evidence that the writing did not constitute a final expression.,
With the minimal factual underpinning of the specificity of the
written terms and the parties' reduction of their agreement to writing,
the appearance of completeness effectively creates a rebuttable
presumption of finality.
Some protection is provided against
overzealous application of this provision by the invitation to negate
the finding by "other evidence" establishing that the writing is not
final.
Although the subject of this provision is a finding of finality,
which ultimately is based upon all relevant evidence, it is useful to
examine it as a basis of comparison of the presumption methodology
in North Carolina. The Restatement's presumption rests upon
something more than the mere presence of a writing. It utilizes a
Williston-type test of completeness, but hedged about by cautionary
language. First, it is triggered not by just any writing, but by the
parties having "reduce[d] an agreement to writing." The first words
emphasize the formality of a writing, suggesting intentionality, rather
than mere happenstance, such as receiving from the other party a
writing to which the recipient attaches no significance. The word

256. Id. at 590, 158 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting Cumming v. Barber, 99 N.C. 332,335-36, 5
S.E. 903, 904-05 (1888)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(3) (1981). It seems fairly
unobjectionable, but it is confusing to invoke the appearance of completeness to support a
finding of finality.
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"reduction" connotes a conscious and intentional process that entails
going to some trouble.258
The presumption is often used as a generalized standard,
apparently thought to resolve both finality and completeness.
However, because finality is a question of actual expressed intent,
while completeness may be tied by the PER to the appearance and
content of the writing itself, it is dangerous and difficult to provide for
both in one rule of presumption. The biggest danger is that a court
will overlook evidence that the parties never intended to make a final
writing as the court of appeals did in Mayo.259 Like much of the
North Carolina methodology, many of the problems created by the
presumption are likely attributable to plucking isolated quotations
from prior opinions without attention to factual, legal and syntactic
context. Attention to underlying policy is omitted in many cases and
facts are too often ignored. The presumption is an unwieldy and
imprecise tool and ought to be discarded.
If it is to be retained, it makes the best sense to restrict the
presumption of completeness to a context in which its principled
application reflects a real factual context as in Bost v. Bost.26 ° Bost's is
not a free-ranging presumption, but is tied to the narrow context of
separatidn agreements. 2 61 Unfortunately, Bost seems to have reestablished the influence of the presumption as a general PER device.
Since Bost there has been a widespread practice in North Carolina of
resolving PER and interpretation issues by applying a presumption
like a large bandage to cover every PER problem.
An unusual presentation of the completeness issue in Medical
Staffing Network, Inc. v. Ridgway2 62 involved a different presumption
arising from a merger clause. After the parties had signed a second
formal contract, a controversy arose over its effect upon the first
formal contract's covenant not to compete.263 What is unusual is that
the issue here is framed as one of novation rather than the PER, a
strategy that may have been beneficial in helping the court to bypass
258. It is believed that such language excludes the receipt in Johnson v. Honeycutt. See
supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
259. Mayo v. N.C. State Univ., 168 N.C. App. 503, 509-10, 608 S.E.2d 116, 121-22
(2001).
260. 234 N.C. 554, 67 S.E.2d 745 (1951). See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying
text.
261. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing Lane v. Scarborough, 355
N.C. 763,618 S.E.2d 227 (2005)).
262. - N.C. App. -, 670 S.E.2d 321 (2009).
263. Id. at -, 670 S.E.2d at 324-25.
264. Id. at -, 670 S.E.2d at 325-26.
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the confused, fragmentary North Carolina PER. However, Corbin
could have included Medical Staffing Network in his PER section on
substituted contracts. The analysis is the same for novation as it
would be for the PER issue, assuming that the court would approach
novation and substitution from the same perspective in the spectrum
of rule choices between pure Williston and pure Corbin.
The analysis in the case has elements of both Williston and
Corbin, but Corbin clearly dominates in the end. There are two
significant indications of his influence: (1) the merger clause does not
by itself prove that the second formal written contract was intended
as a novation, or, in the language of the PER, a final and complete
written contract (total integration); 6 5 and (2) the ultimate test of the
merger clause's effectiveness is whether "it would frustrate the
parties' true intentions. '266 If the PER were the issue, the test applied
would be directed to the finality and completeness of the second
writing. The merger clause triggers a rebuttable presumption that the
written contract "represents the final agreement between the parties,"
but this gives way to extrinsic evidence which the court admits to
show "the parties' overall intended purposes of the transaction in
each case and whether admission of parol evidence will contradict or
support those intentions as expressed in the writing(s). 26 7
Although the exceptions above show the North Carolina courts'
typical care in determining whether a merger clause establishes a
writing's completeness, it is nevertheless true that such clauses often
tip the balance in that direction. When completeness is found,
extrinsic terms that are consistent with the writing are excluded along
with those that are contradictory. It is easy to see the potential for
overlap with the issue of interpretation, since that issue may be
framed in terms of the parties' explicit or tacit agreement to an
idiosyncratic meaning. Not surprisingly, although there is some
question whether interpretation is an issue to which the PER applies,
it has proven impossible to tease these topics apart from one
another.266

265.
266.
S.E.2d
267.
S.E.2d
268.

See id. at _, 670 S.E.2d at 325-26.
Id. at __, 670 S.E.2d at 326 (citing Zinn v. Walker, 87 N.C. App. 325, 333, 361
314, 318 (1987)).
Id. at _, 670 S.E.2d at 326. (quoting Zinn v. Walker, 87 N.C. App. 325, 333, 361
314, 318 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See supra note 67.
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Completeness: Interpretationand Ambiguity

Notwithstanding the controversy over the inclusion of
interpretation as a PER issue,26 9 there is little doubt that an
understanding of each substantially enriches mastery of the other.
Thus, it is an easy decision to include interpretation in this Article to
the extent that it informs the inquiry into the PER's application in
North Carolina. A look at interpretation is especially valuable in
light of the court's use of ambiguity not only as a factor permitting
extrinsic evidence for purposes of interpretation but also as an
indicator of incompleteness under the PER.
Historically, the PER battle has been said to lie in the field of
completeness, 21° with a parallel controversy 27' raging over standards of
interpretation.27 2 As to the latter, North Carolina cases are more
likely than in a PER context to adopt a hard Willistononian rule in
the form of a "plain meaning," "four corners "273 approach. At least,
that is the methodology most cases utilize if their language can be
taken at face value. There is virtual unanimity in North Carolina that
a finding of ambiguity is required, as by Williston's approach, before
269. The North Carolina cases may subsume this issue within "ambiguity." That is a
different matter, however, since the parties may for reasons of their own agree to make an
ordinary word mean something quite different. For example, they may make "night"
mean "day" in order to ensure their privacy or for some other reason. The term is not
made ambiguous by such an agreement; it is merely given private meaning. This author's
belief, shared by Corbin, but not by Williston, is that modern cases should never rule out
the parties' proven or conceded shared intention as to the meaning. Definitions are not
provided by a higher power but by dictionaries and usage; meaning is thus always
dependent upon extrinsic evidence. When the court applies a "plain meaning," it takes
judicial notice of extrinsic evidence without acknowledging its application of a rule of
hierarchy that is indefensible in modern law. No one any longer believes in one
objectively ascertainable meaning for words. See 5 KNIFFIN, supra note 67, § 24.7; Linzer,
supra note 12, at 799-800, 800 n.2 Which dictionary is used, whether the general or the
personal one, should be up to the parties, not the court, when they are in agreement. But
see Root v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272 N.C. 580, 587, 158 S.E.2d 829, 835 (1968) (construing
lease as to inclusion of basement).
270. Calamari and Perillo spoke of "the battleground" as being "the concept of total
integration." Calamari & Perillo, supra note 18, at 337.
271. As noted above, interpretation is variously included or excluded within the PER.
That debate is irrelevant to this Article, which takes a pragmatic approach based upon
what the courts in North Carolina are doing.
272. For Williston's view, see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932); 2
WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 607.
For Corbin's, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 200-08 (1981) and 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, §§ 535, 542. Of interpretation,
one authority says, "These are subjects of the greatest importance in the conduct of
business, commerce, and finance that are the heartbeat of this state's economy, if not of
the economies of the nation and the civilized world." Kaye, supra note 87, § 41:9.
273. See, e.g., Stephens Co. v. Lisk, 240 N.C. 289, 293, 82 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1954) (stating
that contracts must be interpreted according to their entirety or "four corners").
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extrinsic evidence is admissible to construe or interpret the meaning
of the terms of a final written contract.274 However, analysis of what
the courts actually do reveals a mixture of approaches, with many
cases utilizing a test of ambiguity that rests upon assessment of the
meanings actually given to the term by each party.275 Such cases show
an admixture of a strong influence from Corbin and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts to mitigate the effects of the "plain meaning"
standard.
However, ambiguity plays another role in North Carolina cases.
As indicated in the discussion above, ambiguity has crossed the line
from interpretation into the PER proper to become a prominent
feature of some of the formulae applied in North Carolina to
determine completeness or even sometimes finality.
Neal v.
2 6
''
2
Marrone 1 inserted a "free of uncertainty 7 component into the
completeness test under the PER"7 8 and has been often cited for its
test of completeness. 279 The appearance of ambiguity as an issue
under North Carolina's modern PER may be just a sign of confusion.
On the other hand, a reference to a writing's lack of ambiguity or its
"plain meaning" may represent a slightly befuddled Willistonian
focus upon the appearance of the writing as proof of the parties'
intentions relative to it.
The role of ambiguity and the tests by which it can be identified
constitute a major secondary battleground in North Carolina. Some
decisions apply a hard "plain meaning" rule, although with an eye to
customary or context-specific meanings. A second group freely
admits extrinsic evidence, using a soft Corbin-inspired rule of
interpretation, designed to give effect to the parties' real discernible
intentions; these admit all relevant evidence, including the parties'
purposes, situations at making, and objects to be accomplished. A
third group of cases apply a mixed test, citing "plain meaning"
precedent, but looking beyond the writing itself for the parties'
274. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 609. Corbin, not a believer in semantic certainty,
would consider all relevant evidence as to the meaning of any term, without any necessity

to find ambiguity first. 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 542.
275. E.g., Cox v. Cox, No. COA06-873, 2007 WL 2244671, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 27,
2007) (holding, in a case involving a consent judgment, that the court was not limited to
the four corners of the agreement but should take into account the controversy, purpose,
and events involved in the litigation).
276. 239 N.C. 73, 79 S.E.2d 239 (1953).
277. Id. at 77, 79 S.E.2d at 242.
278. See id.
279. It seems likely that the prominent inclusion of a quotation from Neal v. Marrone
in Stansbury may be responsible for the case's influence. 2 STANSBURY, supra note 26,
§ 252.
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intentions. The cases within the three groups are not so consistent as
to be predictable: their methodologies are too haphazard to support
an inference of doctrinal preferences. Nor is it possible to tease away
true PER cases from those involving interpretation and construction
and so achieve at least a descriptive doctrinal purity in this Article.
Consequently, the explication of ambiguity that follows is drawn from
both PER and interpretation cases. Given the characteristically
mechanical and formulaic methodology of the North Carolina PER
cases, it does not seem to matter which of the many formulae is
applied, so there is no attempt to catalog them here. All the old
phrases are still extant and enough has been said of them by
Chadbourn and McCormick and by Dalzell. What follows focuses
instead upon the role of ambiguity and the tests by which its presence
is demonstrated or negated.
i. The Hard Test: Plain Meaning and Four Corners
A true "plain meaning" test is rare in North Carolina. The most
restrictive test possible would invoke a plain meaning rule without
any mention of ambiguity. Such a test would indicate the court's
certainty that its meaning is the only reasonable one and that the
judicial eye is by nature well-equipped to spot ambiguity arising from
the context of the words within the writing's four corners. In such
opinions, ambiguity is likely to be recognized only when the writing's
terms conflict or where the term in question has no obvious
application within the four corners of the writing.2"' This is often
referred to as a "four corners" test, exemplified in the recent
landmark New York case of W. W. W. Associates, Inc. v.
2 81 The conclusion may rest upon precedent, as in the
Giancontieri.
Mobil Oil case below, or it may reflect informal judicial notice of
something like immanent meaning. Hard rules are thought by their
proponents to enhance predictable results, justifying unjust individual
results on grounds of the public good. 2 ' The detractors of such rules
grant the injustice as their inevitable outcome but doubt the public
benefit asserted as their justification.2 83 As asserted in the Discussion
280. See Posner, supra note 2, at 535; cf. W.W.W. Assoc., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566
N.E.2d 639, 643 (N.Y. 1990) (noting a "logical reason" shown on the face of the contract
for the term asserted to be ambiguous).
281. 566 N.E.2d 639 (N.Y. 1990) (rejecting extrinsic evidence that a contract provision
was included solely for the benefit of one party, who might therefore waive it).
282. Williston said the certainty was "more than an adequate compensation for the
slight restriction put upon the power to grant and contract." 2 WILLISTON, supra note 3,
§ 612.
283. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 575.

PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

2009]

1753

Model above, 21 a well-proven meaning or one acknowledged to have
been shared by both parties should prevail over any other meaning in
the absence of an established rule of law to the contrary protecting a
third party whose interest is at stake.285
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Wolfe2 86 shows how thoroughly interwoven
are issues of interpretation with the PER in North Carolina.
Defendants signed guaranty agreements in which the words "signed,
sealed and delivered" appeared above their signatures and "L.S."2 s
beside them. They sought to introduce parol evidence to show they
did not understand what the seal signified and had not been given any
explanation of it and that they did not intend to make a sealed
instrument.
Although it is not made explicit in the opinion, it seems evident
that the defendants saw ambiguity in the variety of meanings the seal
had come to bear.2" 8 They did not seek to prove a different term, but
to show a different meaning of the seal term in the writing. However,
the supreme court barred the extrinsic evidence, relying upon an old
PER case. 89 The court's confusion between the PER (triggered by
finality and completeness) and interpretation (triggered under the
hard rule by ambiguity) is shown in the holding: "We hold that where,
as here, there is no ambiguity on the face of the instrument as to the
adoption of the seal, such testimony is barred by the parol evidence
rule.

290

State v. Philip Morris USA Inc.,29 1 on the other hand, is a
nuanced, careful analysis in which ample justification is made for
284. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.

285. Such third party protections include, for example, the record notice requirement
in Runyon v. Paley, 331 N.C. 293, 313, 416 S.E.2d 177, 191 (1992) and the protections
U.C.C. Article 3 gives to holders in due course. U.C.C. §§ 3-305, 3-306 (1990).
286. 297 N.C. 36, 252 S.E.2d 809 (1979).

287. The court defined "L.S." as "an abbreviation for 'Locus sigilli,' which means 'the
place of the seal.' The symbol is well understood in law and commerce to be a seal." Id.
at 37 n.1, 252 S.E.2d at 810 n.1 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1014 (rev. 4th ed.
1968)).

288. See, e.g., Gagne v. Best Advantage Mktg. Group, Inc., No. COA04-1724, 2005 WL
2649700 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2005).
289. Mobil Oil, 27 N.C. at 39, 252 S.E.2d at 811 (citing Bell v. Chadwick, 226 N.C. 598,
600, 39 S.E.2d 743, 744 (1946)).
290. Id. at 37, 252 S.E.2d at 809.

291. 359 N.C. 763, 618 S.E.2d 219 (2005). The court found there was no tax offset
adjustment under the National Tobacco Growers Settlement Trust for 2004, where no
assessments were scheduled under the 2004 Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act
("FETRA") law until March 2005 and the tobacco companies were obligated to continue
payments to the trust until they actually paid a FETRA obligation. See id. at 781, 618
S.E.2d at 230.
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relying upon the "plain meaning ' rule to construe the National
Tobacco Growers Settlement Trust for the effect, if any, of a
subsequent change in law. The court properly scrutinized the whole
contract, not just any one particular term.293 It examined the language
itself as well as the syntax for indications of the parties' intent at time
of execution, 4 giving the words their common meaning because of
the "degree of lawyerly scrutiny each word ... doubtless underwent"
in drafting. 295 The purposes of both parties for each contested
provision, 2 96 as well as for the agreement as a whole 297 were taken into
account to settle the parties' disagreement as to its meaning. The rule
that written contracts are construed against the drafter was

292. Id. at 775, 618 S.E.2d at 227.
293. Id. at 773, 618 S.E.2d at 225 ("Since the object of construction is to ascertain the
intent of the parties, the contract must be considered as an entirety. The problem is not
what the separate parts mean, but what the contract means when considered as a whole."
(quoting Jones v. Casstevens, 222 N.C. 411, 413-14, 23 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1942)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
294. Id. (citing Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C 407, 409-10, 200 S.E.2d 622, 623 (1973)
and quoting Walton v. City of Raleigh, 342 N.C. 879, 881, 467 S.E,2d 410, 411 (1996)).
295. Id. at 775, 618 S.E.2d at 227 (noting that settlors conceded the great detail and
precision of drafting).
296. For example, it "appears" to the court that a purpose is that "Settlors ...not
receive offsets for assessments not tied directly to cigarette production," so that both "for
the same year" and "in connection with" both modify "paid." Id. at 776, 618 S.E.2d at 227
(internal quotation marks omitted). Then, the court rejected a reading of other language
to mean that the new law itself triggered the offset adjustment, pointing to a qualifier in
that paragraph and continuing,
Furthermore we very much doubt the trial court's construction of the wording ...
reflects the original understanding of the parties. The court would allow a Tax
Offset Adjustment even if the government never collects the assessments due
under a qualifying change of law and hence never spends them for the benefit of
tobacco farmers. Under those circumstances, tobacco farmers would receive
reduced distributions (or no distributions) from the Phase 11 Trust and nothing
from the government. The negative financial implications of this scenario for
tobacco farmers are obvious.
Id. at 777, 618 S.E.2d at 228. Phillip Morris USA Inc. sets a standard based not upon
mechanical or formulaic rules, but upon real analysis.
297. Id. at 779, 618 S.E.2d at 229 ("Certainly the most compelling reason for rejecting
[Settlor's interpretation] is that, taken to its logical extreme, it could defeat the express
purpose of the Phase II Trust. As previously explained, the Trust was crafted to protect
tobacco farmers from economic harm caused by the MSA [Master Settlement
Agreement]."). The court said the trial court acknowledged unfairness to the farmers of
its holding, but that it emphasized equally burdensome results to the Settlors the other
way. The Supreme Court of North Carolina pointed out that the Settlors knew at the
beginning that a tobacco buyout might take longer than the Trust's obligation period,
noting it took seven years to reach FETRA. See id. at 780, 618 S.E.2d at 229. After
considering the purposes of both sides it found that it "r[an] squarely counter to the
express purpose of the Trust" to leave farmers without the extra income for years. See id.
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acknowledged 29" but not applied because the Trust Agreement
expressly stated that neither party was to be considered the drafter.299
Ironically, the leading case on interpretation, Lane v.
Scarborough,3" is based upon a PER case, Bost v. Bost.3 ' In Lane,
Justice Sharp held that an implied right to inherit from a deceased
spouse was inconsistent with the language of a separation agreement
in which the parties released property rights and rights to administer
each others' estates." 2 Although framed as an interpretation case
involving implication in fact, the inheritance right in Lane can also be
understood as an extrinsic term governed by the PER. Either way,
concerns for finality, certainty, and predictability as to the property
division in the settlement agreement were equally implicated, which
may explain the case's atypically hard interpretation rule.
Justice Sharp began conventionally with a Corbin-like formula
seeking the parties' intentions in "the subject matter, the end in view,
the purpose sought, and the situation of the parties at the time."303
However, she immediately backed away, asserting that "the intention
of the parties" is a question of law for the court when there is no
disputed fact or ambiguity in the written contract. °4 She then looked
to see whether the inheritance right was to be implied in fact in this
agreement.30 5
The decision in Lane justified its "four corners" approach by
pointing out that "the 'term "separation and property settlement
agreement" in the absence of clear language or impelling implications
connotes not only complete and permanent cessation of marital
relations, but a full and final settlement of all property rights of every
kind and character.' "306 In light of that connotation, additional terms,
including those creatively implied in fact, are fairly characterized as
contradictory.
298. The rule is applied selectively, most notably in cases where one of the parties is in
a group thought more than usually likely to be taken advantage of by those situated the
other party, for example, insurance cases. As authority for the rule of construction against
the drafter, the court cites Chavis v. S. Life Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 259, 262, 347 S.E.2d 425, 427
(1986). Phillip Morris USA Inc., 359 N.C. at 773 n.14, 618 S.E.2d at 225 n.14.
299. Id.
300. 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973).
301. 234 N.C. 554, 67 S.E.2d 745 (1951). See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying
text (discussing Bost v. Bost).
302. Lane, 284 N.C. at 409-10, 200 S.E.2d at 624-25.
303. Id. at 410, 200 S.E.2d at 624 (quoting Elec. Co. v. Ins. Co., 229 N.C. 518, 520, 50
S.E.2d 295. 297 (1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 411, 200 S.E.2d at 625.
306. Id. (quoting Bost, 234 N.C. at 557, 67 S.E.2d at 747).
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One danger of a hard rule is that a court may go so far as to
impose its own meaning over the meaning attributed to a term by
both of the parties, without justification in the facts or in the general
context. This occurred in Walton v. City of Raleigh,3"' in which the
court construed a consent judgment in a way that not only ran
counter to the attested understandings of both parties, but also left
the plaintiffs considerably worse off than they would have been
without it.3" 8 In Walton, the plaintiffs sought access to sewer lines for
which Wake County had obtained an easement across their land. The
consent judgment provided plaintiffs' access to the sewer lines
"subject to ...obtaining tap-on privileges from the appropriate
governing bodies."3 9 Raleigh (the county's successor) refused until
plaintiffs connected to water lines, which were located at such
distance that it would cost $270,000. The court read the consent
judgment to require Raleigh's consent as the "appropriate governing
body," which it could deny until the plaintiffs complied with its
regulations.3 1 ° The court was confident of its reading of the
agreement even when the plaintiffs pointed out that, without it, they
would be entitled with all other property owners to connect to the
sewers. To the plaintiffs' argument that having both original parties
in opposition to the court's interpretation made the consent judgment
ambiguous, the court responded, "Parties can differ as to the
interpretation of language without its being ambiguous, and we find
no ambiguity here."3 '
There is no indication that the city relied to its detriment on a
particular interpretation or of any public policy concerns in Walton.
Moreover, the court failed to acknowledge what appeared to be
expert interpretation afforded by the county's attorney, whose
affidavit along with plaintiffs' was held inadmissible.3 12 A dispute in
307. 342 N.C. 879, 467 S.E.2d 410 (1996).
308. See id. at 881, 467 S.E.2d at 411-12.
309. Id. at 880, 467 S.E.2d at 411.
310. Id. at 881, 467 S.E.2d at 411.
311. Id. at 881-82, 467 S.E.2d at 412.
312. Id. at 881, 467 S.E.2d at 411. Compare to Cowell v. Gaston County, - N.C. App.
- 660 S.E.2d 915, 920 (2008), showing the court's characteristically careful analysis in
an insurance case, noting the testimony of an assistant county manager that he did not
consider inspection a "professional service."
Having offered Beasley as not only a reasonable person, but one of its employees
most qualified to interpret the contested insurance policies, defendant may not
now argue the opposite. This testimony raises at least a question of material fact
concerning defendant's reasonable understanding of the coverage it was
purchasing. Beasley's testimony further provides some evidence as to defendant's
intent and understandingof the coverage it was purchasing.
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which both contracting parties side with one another against the
court's reading should at least be entitled to a second look. In
Walton, there was no factual analysis to substantiate the "plain
meaning" attributed to the term by the court.
ii. The Soft Test
Coexisting beside the hard test cases is a group exemplifying a
fact-oriented analysis strongly suggestive of Corbin's influence. At
first glance, few decisions seem to fit this category. North Carolina
cases nearly always say that they are using a plain meaning approach.
However, a more careful reading may expose a different standard.
Often the standard is a very liberal one.
Many cases define ambiguity by tests that include the term's
susceptibility to either of the party's particular meanings. An
illustrative case is Kimbrell v. Roberts,1 3 a suit by a creditor against a
corporation's guarantor for breach of sale of stock and debentures, in
which the court found an ambiguity "where the terms of the contract
are reasonably susceptible to either of the differing interpretations
proffered by the parties. '314 This standard is very liberal, requiring
examination and an implicit evaluation of the reasonableness in
context of each of the parties' asserted understandings. Not only are
these courts examining extrinsic evidence, but it is of the subjective
variety, limited in its relevance, of course, by the usual rule of the
objective theory of contracts. 315 The filter of reasonableness protects
to some extent against errors and gives the parties a good opportunity
to have their full arguments heard and the court an equivalent
opportunity to ensure that the analysis comports with legal standards.
However, the court went considerably beyond this, finding that the
very fact of a dispute was some indication of ambiguity. 316 This is
perhaps the most liberal test that still retains any PER at all. The
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
313. 186 N.C. App. 68, 650 S.E.2d 444 (2007), disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 87, 655 S.E.2d
838 (2007).
314. Id. at 73, 650 S.E.2d at 447.
315. See Root v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272 N.C. 580, 585-86, 158 S.E.2d 829, 834 (1968)
(" 'A contract, express or implied, executed or executory, results from the concurrence of
minds of two or more persons, and its legal consequences are not dependent upon the
impressions or understandings of one alone of the parties to it. It is not what either thinks,
but what both agree.' " (quoting Prince v. McRae, 84 N.C. 674. 675 (1881))).
316. Kimbrell, 186 N.C. App. at 73, 650 S.E.2d at 447 (" 'The fact that a dispute has
arisen as to the parties' interpretation of the contract is some indication that the language
of the contract is, at best, ambiguous.' " (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Freeman-White Assoc., Inc., 322 N.C. 77, 83, 366 S.E.2d 480, 484 (1988) as quoted in
Glover v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 109 N.C. App. 451, 456,428 S.E.2d 206, 209 (1993))).
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language of the writing is characteristically given great significance in
such cases, but it gives way to a clearly proven intention, as long as it
has not been superseded. The goal of these cases is to give effect to
the parties' actual expressed intentions.
A substantial and consistent line of cases provides a soft rule for
insurance cases, evaluating a term's ambiguity from the perspective of
a reasonable person in the insured's position and exhibiting vigilance
against' "slippery" terms, which in one case included the word
"you."317 The liberal rule applied in Kimbrell traces back to a 1970
insurance case, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire
Insurance Co.,318 which obviously has not been limited to insurance
cases, as it might have been given its reference to the rule of strict
construction against the insurer.3 19
Majestic Cinema Holdings, LLC v. High Point Cinema32
involved a duty asserted to be implied in fact by interpretation of the
32 1 it could easily be
written contract. Like Lane v. Scarborough,
framed as a PER case rather than one of interpretation. At issue in
Majestic Cinema was a tenant's liability to pay back rent accumulated
during a period when his payment was excused by the landlord's
failure to have open a certain square footage of adjacent retail
space.322 As a matter of strategy, it is possible that the case was not
presented as a PER issue because no such term was actually agreed
to. The landlord presented it as one of interpretation, contending the
duty was lurking unexpressed as an inherent term of the written lease.
The court began by reciting a common refrain, that if a contract's
meaning " 'is clear and only one reasonable interpretation exists, the
courts must enforce the contract as written; they may not, under the
guise of construing an ambiguous term, rewrite the contract or
impose liabilities on the parties not bargained for and found
therein.' "323 Nevertheless, the court did examine the writing to
determine whether it might also be susceptible to the landlord's
reasoning, concluding that his interpretation would necessitate
317. See Cowell, - N.C. App. at -, 660 S.E.2d at 920.
318. 276 N.C. 348, 172 S.E.2d 518 (1970).
319. Id. at 354, 172 S.E.2d at 522 ("No ambiguity, calling the above rule of construction
into play, exists unless, in the opinion of the court, the language of the policy is fairly and
reasonably susceptible to either of the constructions for which the parties contend.").
320. - N.C. App. -, 662 S.E.2d 20 (2008), disc. rev. denied, __ N.C. __, 662 S.E.2d 20
(2008).
321. 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973). See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
322. Majestic Cinema, - N.C. App. at __, 662 S.E.2d at 22.
323. Id. at _, 662 S.E.2d at 22 (quoting Duke Energy Corp. v. Malcolm, 178 N.C. App.
62, 65, 630 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2006)).
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specific language. "Therefore," it said, "we cannot say the landlord's
interpretation of the contract is reasonable. We hold the meaning of
324
the contract is clear and only one reasonable interpretation exists.,
The analysis in the case points to an ambiguity rule much like that in
Kimbrell, although the rule stated emphasizes a "reasonable person"
test.
A case noteworthy for its attention to the facts in resolving the
issue of ambiguity is Litvak v. Smith,325 although the court scarcely
paused to administer the test itself. In Litvak, the obligation of a real
estate purchaser was conditioned upon his obtaining final approval
for rezoning to residential use. 32 6 Turned down by the board, he
appealed, at which point the seller called it quits. The court found the
purchaser's failure to obtain rezoning approval within a reasonable
time constituted a failure of condition precedent, allowing the vendor
to terminate the contract. 27 Carefully analyzing the terms of the
contract as to time for performance as well as the parties' conduct
afterwards, the court directed its inquiry to the parties' intention at
the time of making.3 28 Like Kimbrell, this court found ambiguity in
329
the susceptibility of the language to either of the parties' meanings.
Considering express provisions relating to time and circumstances as
well as conduct of the parties relative to time, the court held for the
vendor, concluding, "it is patently unreasonable to require defendant
to keep the contract open pending resolution of plaintiffs' uncertain
and indefinite litigation with the Town of North Topsail Beach."33 °
iii. Mixed Tests
Many cases fall between the two extremes. There are two sorts.
One group is mixed in the sense of applying a hard test to one kind of
issue and a soft test to another. Separation agreements as a group fall
into this category. The other group mixes soft and hard tests together
as to the same issue. Some of these no doubt illustrate no more than
confusion, with the rule fragments strung together without making
any distinction between them. Others make a way among the
fragments, hewing to a middle course neither quite hard nor soft.
324.

Id. at _, 662 S.E.2d at 23.

325. 180 N.C. App. 202, 636 S.E.2d 327 (2006).
326. Id. at 203, 636 S.E.2d at 328.
327. Id. at 206, 636 S.E.2d at 329-30.
328. Id. at 206, 636 S.E.2d at 330.
329. Id. at 209, 636 S.E.2d at 331.
330. Id. at 209, 636 S.E.2d at 331-32. Litvak is another case in which implication in fact
and interpretation/construction issues are so closely related as to invoke either the PER or
rules of interpretation or both.
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These cases tend to give strong emphasis to the words used in the
writing, but with less confidence that something like a DNA profile is
possible for words, especially if the evidence of the parties'
interpretations is very credible. They may be apt to keep a stronger
focus on the context in which the writing was drafted than do hardrule cases. The principled mixed cases reflect attention to extrinsic
evidence, but at a distance. They do not, for example, refer to the
separate meanings attached by each of the parties to determine
ambiguity. It seems likely they would apply the parties' mutual
meaning even if the term is unambiguous, unless third parties or
society in general is likely to be injured. Courts in this group may ask
whether a term is susceptible of more than one "reasonable" meaning
even after finding a plain meaning for the term.
Mixed-test cases often recite a "plain meaning" rule, but then
look beyond the four corners of the writing for extrinsic indications of
ambiguity. Where these cases often vary from the soft-test cases is in
restricting the ambiguity test to the meaning given the term by
"reasonable persons" rather than the litigants themselves. The
difference may not be great, because the litigants must establish their
credibility in order that their meanings be considered by the court in
soft-test cases. It is possible, however, that extrinsic evidence is
examined with a more favorable eye or that more of it is considered
by the soft-test courts.
Separation agreements as a group (because they rarely involve
both extrinsic terms and interpretation in the same case) are good
examples of mixed tests. North Carolina courts often use a hard PER
A "hard"
for these cases, but a soft rule of interpretation. 31
Willistonian PER test is applied to exclude extrinsic terms not only to
contradict the writing but to supplement it as well. The separation
agreement itself is the virtually exclusive witness to its own finality
and completeness. This technique gives the writing the effect of

331. This is opposite to the mixture suggested in Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott,
The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 309, 309 n.127 (1985), which is criticized by

Posner, supra note 2, at 559-60. After exploring what he calls "conflicting" assumptions,
Posner concludes, "[blecause the ambiguity rules and completeness rules overlap so much,
with both of them referring essentially to the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret writings
that do not allocate obligations in sufficient detail, the use of different assumptions for
each argument is not justified." Posner, supra note 2, at 560. He is speaking generally, not
of separation agreements, and his arguments are economic ones. This author believes the
strategy evolved by the North Carolina courts for separation agreements works admirably
and makes good sense both economically and by more relational or traditionally
normative standards.
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marking emphatically the end of the parties' relationship and
signifying the end of controversy, at least as to property. The terms
that are in the writing cannot be challenged and those that are outside
can never come in. As long as the writing looks final and complete to
the court's experienced eye, it fixes property rights permanently.
Neither party being able to add or subtract from it, both can depend
332 provides authority for
upon it to go forward. Lane v. Scarborough
applying such a hard test to limit the implication of terms333 that are
not obviously necessary to carry out the writing's express terms.
The separation agreements that exemplify mixed tests often use a
soft rule of interpretation to determine the meaning of the express
written terms.334
This likely reflects the experienced court's
awareness of the circumstances in which these agreements may be
signed. Executed in an emotionally charged context, often with
minimal assistance of counsel if any, the separation agreement's
words may require judicial support to become decipherable, much
less fully credible as reflections of both parties' intentions. Not
surprisingly, courts often look at all relevant evidence to understand
what the parties actually meant.
Attentive interpretation and
construction may also prevent the agreement's being held fatally
indefinite. An excellent example is provided by Judge Hunter's
3 35 relied upon by the supreme court
dissent in Jackson v. Jackson,
as
336
grounds for its reversal.
Judge Hunter applies a plain meaning rule,
but with such attention to the facts and such informed pragmatism
that what seems "plain" to the judge have might seemed equally plain
to Corbin. The contract was saved from being lost to vagueness and
uncertainty by practical interpretation and extrinsic evidence to
bolster terms made ambiguous by their lack of specificity.
A good example of the kind of mixed cases that interweave hard
and soft rules together is Root v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"' which
combines plain meaning language requiring an unambiguous contract
to be interpreted "as written"3'38 with the liberal instruction that
332. 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973).
333. What is meant here are those terms implied in fact, not terms implied by law.
334. E.g., Borgersrode v. Borgersrode, No. COA06-1362, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1299,

at *4 (N.C. Ct. App. June 19, 2007) (applying a test of susceptibility to both of the parties'
meanings).
335. 169 N.C. App. 46, 54, 610 S.E.2d 731, 736 (2005) (Hunter, J., dissenting), rev'd and
remanded per curiam, 360 N.C. 56, 59, 620 S.E.2d 862, 863 (2005) (grounding the reversal
in the reasons stated in Judge Hunter's dissent).
336. Jackson v. Jackson, 360 N.C. 56, 56, 620 S.E.2d 862, 863 (2005).
337. 272 N.C. 580, 158 S.E.2d 829 (1968).
338. Id. at 583, 158 S.E.2d at 832.
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" '[t]he heart of a contract is the intention of the parties, which is to
be ascertained from the expressions used, the subject matter, the end
in view, the purpose sought, and the situation of the parties at the
time.' ""9
Register v. White,34 ° also an insurance case, declares its middle-ofthe-road position very clearly: "An ambiguity can exist when, even
though the words themselves appear clear, the specific facts of the
case create more than one reasonable interpretation of the
'
It applied the reasonable person test for
contractual provisions."3 41
ambiguity as is characteristic of this mixed-test group: " '[A] contract
of insurance should be given that construction which a reasonable
person in the position of the insured would have understood it to
mean and, if the language ...is reasonably susceptible of different
constructions, it must be given the construction most favorable to the
insured.' "342
Marking a trend toward a predictable analysis may be easier in
cases involving interpretation than in pure PER cases. Outside a few
distinctive categories, the PER cases in North Carolina defy
prediction. Not even a common rationale can always be found. Some
of the doctrinal inconsistency and haphazard analysis is due to the
prevailing methodology, which is to quote fragments of the rule from
prior cases and string them together without analysis; some, no doubt,
is due to simple confusion. Certainly one answer to the problems in
the cases is to pay greater attention to the facts. One might suppose
that the other part of the obvious solution is to be sure that the
authority relied upon is both internally consistent and consistent with
the court's own policies and goals. The problem is that the
identification of those policies and goals may be frustrated by the
complexity of the PER itself.
V. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE RATIONALE, STRATEGY, AND
INTERPLAY WITH INTERPRETATION

Some of the mysteries cloaking the PER have serious practical
implications that may stymie the best efforts of bench and bar to
shape the case law into a coherent and principled whole.

339. Id. at 583, 158 S.E.2d at 832 (quoting Sell v. Hotchkiss, 264 N.C. 185, 191, 141
S.E.2d 259, 265 (1965)).
340. 358 N.C. 691, 599 S.E.2d 549 (2004).
341. Id. at 695, 599 S.E.2d at 553.
342. Id. at 699, 599 S.E.2d at 556 (quoting Grant v. Emmco Ins. Co., 295 N.C. 39, 43,
243 S.E.2d 894. 897 (1978)).
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One such mystery is the PER's rationale, which explains why
that foundation subject appears at the end of this Article, rather than
at the beginning: its assessment requires some understanding of the
cases themselves. Just as there is no authoritative version of the rule
itself, there is no consensus rationale. As frustrating as that may be, it
does not diminish the PER's use as an ideal strategic tool.
One rationale universally recognized for the PER is to prevent
terms superseded in later stages of negotiation from being revived by
juries. For example, the jury is properly prevented from hearing of a
favorable duration term, later discarded in exchange for a better price
under the final written contract. If that were the only goal, the rule
might have no role in a judge-tried case, for no matter how wellproven the earlier agreement, the court will not be misled to apply
the superseded term because judges understand how contract
negotiations work. Perhaps it is because this function of the PER is
so well understood to be a baseline rationale3 43 that it seems largely a
self-policing principle seldom necessitating litigation.344
Credibility is much more often invoked as a rationale,345 but
concentrating on credibility makes for inconsistent case law. 46 When

343. See, e.g., Craig v. Kessing, 297 N.C. 32, 35, 253 S.E.2d 264, 265 (1979) ("This rule
applies where the writing totally integrates all the terms of a contract or supersedes all
other agreements relating to the transaction.").
344. But see Dalzell supra note 7, at 437 ("The possibility that the agreement was made
as part of the provisional tentative arrangements preceding the final agreement, and
surrendered in the bargain finally signed, sealed and delivered-that possibility seems to
be ignored.").
345. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Weiskopt, Supplementing Written Agreements: Restating the
Parol Evidence Rule in Terms of Credibilityand Relative Fault,34 EMORY L.J. 93, 103 n.41
(1985) ("Evidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when the fact
finder is likely to be misled. The rule must therefore be based on the credibility of the
evidence." (quoting Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 554 (Cal. 1968) (Traynor, C.J.))
(citing 3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 582)); see also McCormick, supra note 38, at 369 ("[The
PER] enables the judge to head off the difficulty at its source, not by professing to decide
any question as to the credibility of the asserted oral variation, but by professing to
exclude the evidence from the jury altogether."). For a North Carolina example of
credibility as a rationale, see Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Morehead, 209 N.C.
174, 175, 183 S.E. 606, 607 (1936) ("It is well-nigh axiomatic that no verbal agreement
between the parties to a written contract, made before or at the time of the execution of
such contract, is admissible to vary its terms or to contradict its provisions. As against the
recollection of the parties, whose memories may fail them, the written word abides. The
rule undoubtedly makes for the sanctity and security of contracts.").
346. See McCormick, supra note 38, at 369 ("This all-inclusive prohibition by rule of
law against any competition of oral agreements with written was effective enough as a
jury-excluding formula, but as an actual standard of decision for judges it was wholly
illusory."). Dalzell thought that most people "have made their agreement in writing in
order to have a record of the contract terms that is precise, permanent and reliable. They
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a party's veracity is in doubt, the PER may be invoked to prevent her
from undermining a written term with an inconsistent oral one.347
The court need only recite the rule, which bars an extrinsic term on
grounds that it contradicts a writing intended as final.348 So far, so

good, but suppose the next case features a highly credible or even a
conceded extrinsic term that contradicts the final writing. In many
such cases, at least where the earlier term is not superseded, North
Carolina courts seem to regard the conflict between the two agreed-to
terms as evidence of ambiguity in the written term.3 49 When
ambiguity is the focus, the inquiry ordinarily falls under the heading
of "interpretation." The switch from ascertaining the terms of the
agreement to determining the meaning of the written term supplies a
context for giving effect to both terms actually agreed to by the
parties if they can be made consistent. This scenario makes evident
the difficulty of teasing apart interpretation and the PER, no matter
how strong the theoretical justification for doing so.
One could envision, on very similar facts with parties who are
sophisticated and represented by counsel, that the PER might not be
raised at all, the interpretation issue being presented by itself as it is
in State v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc.35 ° In such a case, the specter of

enforcing a superseded term becomes a real danger. A North
Carolina court might be inclined to circle the wagons by relying upon
a "plain meaning" rule to deny any effect to such extrinsic evidence.
As an alternative, the PER can be raised on the court's own motion
as a substantive rule of contract law. If the understanding originated
in a promise, representation, or discussion prior to the final writing, it
could be addressed as a term. The PER's mechanism works well to
avoid an inconsistent, superseded term when a contract has been
negotiated sequentially. The usefulness of novation as an alternative

intend the integration as protection against forgetfulness and against falsehood." Dalzell,
supra note 7, at 421.
347. Of course, the parol evidence rule bars prior written terms as well as prior and
contemporaneous oral ones, but the credibility issue invariably arises in the context of oral
terms.
348. The issue of finality is rarely addressed explicitly in North Carolina cases. Finality
should rest upon actual intent rather than a legal fiction, because the PER does not apply
until after a final writing is executed.
349. See supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text. But see Walton v. City of Raleigh,
342 N.C. 879, 881-82, 467 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1996) ("Parties can differ as to the
interpretation of language without its being ambiguous ...").
350. 359 N.C. 763, 618 S.E.2d 219 (2005). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes
291-99 and accompanying text.
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to the PER in avoiding superseded terms is suggested by Medical
Staffing Network, Inc. v. Ridgway,35 discussed above.
If a questionable oral term is consistent with the writing, it poses
a problem insofar as the stated rationale for the PER is credibility. A
judge's natural impulse is to exclude such a term by resorting to the
line of North Carolina cases referred to above that bars parol
evidence to "vary, contradict, or add to" the written terms.352
'
that all
Alternatively, the courts often invoke a "presumption"3 53
terms have been merged in the written agreement. The problem is
that, as the discussion above demonstrates, North Carolina courts
often fail to address in the round the essential preliminary issue of
complete integration as a predicate for the term's exclusion or as a
basis for the presumption. Unfettered by painstaking analysis,
especially of finality, the PER may function as a non-statutory statute
of frauds under which the mere presence of any writing triggers as a
matter of law a prohibition of oral terms. 4 On the other hand, if
credibility is the acknowledged rationale, a court might be expected
351. __ N.C. App. -, 670 S.E.2d 321 (2009). For a discussion of the case, see supra
notes 262-67; see also Zinn v. Walker, 87 N.C. App. 325, 336, 361 S.E.2d 314, 319 (1987)
(involving a similar novation).
352. See McCormick, supra note 38, at 369.
353. See, e.g., Neal v. Marrone, 239 N.C. 73, 77, 79 S.E.2d 239, 242 (1953) ("[lIt is
presumed the writing was intended by the parties to represent all their engagements as to
the elements dealt with in the writing."); see also Bost v. Bost, 234 N.C. 554, 557, 67 S.E.2d
745, 747 (1951) ("It is a well established rule of evidence and of substantive law that
matters resting in parol leading up to the execution of a written contract are considered as
varied by and merged in the written instrument .... '[T]he parties, when they reduce their
contract to writing, are presumed to have inserted in it all the provisions by which they are
bound.' 'The writing is conclusive as to the terms of the bargain.' Applying this rule to
the instant case, the parties are presumed to have integrated their negotiations and
agreements into the written memorial embodying the unequivocal terms and conditions of
their separation agreement." (first quoting Ray v. Blackwell, 94 N.C. 10, 12 (1885) then
quoting Williams v. McLean, 220 N.C. 504, 506, 17 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1941)). But see Craig
v. Kessing, 297 N.C. 32, 34-35, 253 S.E.2d 264, 265-66 (1979) ("We think the sentence
[quoted in the Neal parenthetical] needs clarification as it leaves the impression that even
when a document is not complete at the time of signing, and other provisions are added,
parol evidence with respect to the additions is not admissible.... It appears to be well
settled in this jurisdiction that parol testimony of prior or contemporaneous negotiations
or conversations inconsistent with a written contract entered into between the parties, or
which tends to substitute a new or different contract for the one evidenced by writing, is
incompetent. This rule applies where the writing totally integrates all the terms of a
contract or supersedes all other agreements relating to the transaction. The rule is
otherwise where it is shown that the writing is not a full integration of the terms of the
contract. The terms not included in the writing may then be shown by parol.") (citations
omitted).
354. See, e.g., Capps v. NW Sign Indus., COA 06-1297, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1816, at
*20-21 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2007); cf Calamari & Perillo, supra note 18, at 340, 340
n.40 (discussing Dollar v. Int'l Banking Corp., 109 P. 499 (Cal. 1910)).
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to admit and give effect to an extrinsic term that was clearly or
concededly agreed to and consistent with the writing.3 5 5 In this case, a
different line of cases may be invoked barring contradiction but not
supplementation.
In the alternative, the court may regard the
existence of the extrinsic term as an indication of the writing's
incompleteness.
CONCLUSION

Justice Holmes once said, "A word is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly
in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
'
which it is used."356
His words capture a large part of Corbin's
argument in favor of a liberal PER, if indeed there must be one at all.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina responded to Professor
Dalzell's earlier criticisms:
Although Professor Dalzell in his law review article is
somewhat critical of the North Carolina rule as being too
liberal, he does state that while some courts emphasize the
protection of the written instrument from invasion, the
emphasis in North Carolina is rather in the direction of giving
the proponent of the oral agreement a chance to prove that it
was made if he can, and that by so doing the North Carolina
decisions may sometimes come closer to enforcing the contract
that should be enforced than do the more conservative
authorities.3 57
If the court today would endorse that statement, it must be
dismayed by the more recent case law. The prevailing North Carolina
methodology has degenerated into a fragmented recitation that
deprives the rule of what is perhaps its principal justification, which is
predictability. The legal landscape is littered with PER fragments
that might have been linked together to frame a rule with doctrinal
consistency, capable of providing guidance to practitioners and
judges. The effect of reading the North Carolina PER cases is

355. That is the effect of the cases identified above as implementing a liberal Corbintype approach or a soft rule of interpretation. The assertion in the text assumes that the
relevant rationale is credibility alone, i.e., that there is no danger of giving effect to a
superseded term.
356. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
357. Borden, Inc. v. Brower, 284 N.C. 54, 61, 199 S.E.2d 414, 419 (1973).
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befuddlement and frustration, or as Justice Susie Sharp was fond of
saying, "Confusion worse confounded!"35' 8
Furthermore, to the extent that Williston's analysis has become
entrenched, the court that defended its principles against Dalzell's
criticisms has additional cause for dismay in that the benignity of the
formerly liberal approach to parol evidence seems to be giving way to
a cold indifference to the reality of the transactions involved. Justice
Holmes' warning about the contextuality of language is instructive for
those who are bewitched by the fantasy of a fixed and unchanging
verbal universe. In the service of their ideal, they disregard wellproven obligations undertaken and relied upon by parties who do not
view their transactions as legal fictions. Applied without constraint of
context, the effect of a hard PER is all the more bitter because it fails
to provide a talisman against confusion and perplexity. No one has
yet ascertained the cost to society and to those affected by apparent
judicial indifference, of finding their just expectations sacrificed in the
pursuit of a verbal holy grail.
Of course, even a coherent and just rule may have incoherent
and unjust effects. In North Carolina, however, the PER is neither
intrinsically coherent nor just. Having been reduced to fragmentary
358. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 117, 229 S.E.2d 297, 304 (1976)
(Sharp, J., concurring). In her concurrence, Justice Sharp asserted that, in overruling a
case in dictum, the majority "can only further confuse an area of the law which is rapidly
becoming confusion worse confounded." Id. At the time of the Newton case, this author
was law clerk to Justice James G. Exum, Jr., who wrote the majority opinion.
There is a substantial catalog of North Carolina cases that have used the phrase,
usually without attribution and sometimes with hilarious results. A good example of the
latter is Turner v. L.L. Murphrey Hog Co., 43 N.C. App. 314, 317-18, 258 S.E.2d 825, 827
(1979), in which a jury foreman asked the judge, "Was there an average of 34 pigs
weighing less or did each pig weigh less than 40 pounds?" When the judge's response was
unhelpful, the foreman asked a second time: "Was it average or each?" The judge's
response was, "Each has nothing to do with average." The exchange inspired the court to
comment, "John Milton in Paradise Lost described Hell as, 'Confusion worse
confounded.' The 'hellish' position in which the participants to this comedy of errors
found themselves is manifest in the colloquy between the jury and the judge." Id. at 318,
258 S.E.2d at 827.
In the earliest case, Young v. Young, 81 N.C. 91 (1879) (involving a procedural
issue of misjoinder), the court encountered " 'confusion worse confounded' " as a result of
too great an abundance and diversity of case law and commentary. Id. at 97. The subject
had become "complex, uncertain, and defiant of logic," leaving judges and commentators
"adrift" without meaningful guidance. Id.
No doubt, the PER provokes sentiments similar to those expressed in Young.
Frustration and confusion generate hopelessness, which undercuts the analytical process;
in turn, the fragmentary and quixotic case law breeds greater and greater frustration and
confusion. It is instructive that the court in Young seems to have gained something by its
explicit acknowledgment of the "confusion worse confounded," for it went on to decide
the case methodically and with apparent confidence that it had reached a just result.
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snippets, it is equally incoherent and unfair as applied. Thus, not only
is legal enforceability denied to terms that have clearly been agreed
to, but the application of the rule is so poorly marshaled that it stands
little chance of operating to good effect.
As widespread confusion and frustration3 5 9 predominate in the
state courts, federal courts have been left largely to fend for
themselves. In Smith v. Central Soya of Athens, Inc.,36 a wellreasoned case from the Eastern District of North Carolina, the court
could hardly have helped but observe, "[I]t is impossible to reconcile
all of the statements of the parol evidence rule contained in North
Carolina cases .... "361 Unfortunately, the hopeful observation in
Central Soya that North Carolina common law opinions were
beginning to mirror the "certainly better-drafted"36' 2 U.C.C.36 3 has
proven premature. Rarely, if ever, is a case overruled in North
Carolina for error in the words used to represent the PER itself,
leaving many inconsistent lines of precedent in North Carolina
undisturbed, co-existing as approximate equals. No doubt, confusion
generated by the rule's difficulty is partly to blame, for no one can be
sure what is correct and what erroneous. It is tempting to believe that
some may have given up the effort. What is undeniable is that the
prevailing preference for formulaic recitation rather than analysis
masks profound differences between one version of the PER and the
next. Over time, the mind slips away from anything repeated
mechanically,3" gradually mixing in a half-conscious idiosyncratic
content and ending with nonsense, somewhat in the same way that
half-listening to song lyrics distorts their meaning.
Personal
359. 2 KENNETH S. BROUN, BRANDIS & BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE

§ 260 (5th ed. 1993) ("It is impossible to reconcile all the statements of the rule contained
in the North Carolina cases."); see also JOHN N. HUTSON & SCOTT A. MISKIMMON,

NORTH CAROLINA CONTRACT LAW § 5-4 (2001) ("The fact is that the parol evidence
rule is difficult of application (and is likely to remain so even in UCC cases); and, unless a
precedent for the particular situation can be found, it is hazardous to predict the ultimate
disposition of any case in which an asserted oral agreement deals with the same general
subject matter as the writing and does not squarely contradict its express terms.... [The
North Carolina decisions] are inevitably somewhat indefinite; and, in situations not
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, it is not surprising to find that specific
applications to miscellaneous types of contracts seem to be inconsistent.").
360. 604 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
361. Id. at 523.
362. Id. at 524 n.5. For a discussion of how North Carolina courts are mirroring the
Uniform Commercial Code analysis, see id. at 523 n.4, 524 n.5.
363. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-202 (2007).
364. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 38, at 380 ("[Courts have inherited the]
anaesthetic qualities of the language-technique about 'contradicting,' 'admissibility,' and
'completeness'....").
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experience fills in what is uncertain. Children hear, "Gladly the
cross-eyed bear," not "Gladly the cross I'd bear"; a teenager sings
tunelessly,
I'm in the mood for love,
Simply because you're near me,
Funny Butt, when you're near me,
I'm in the mood for love.365
Doctrinal haziness has erased the demarcations between
inconsistent lines of PER precedent, allowing them to coexist when
they ought not. Nonsense is the result, but in this case it is not funny.
Intervention by the Supreme Court of North Carolina is sorely
needed to take matters in hand. The task need not be a nightmare.
The current inconsistency permits some room to maneuver, but it
leaves the bench and the bar perplexed. If flexibility is the goal, why
not embrace Corbin's version of the rule, which allows all relevant
evidence to be considered in order to give effect to the parties' actual
intentions? The U.C.C. PER, carrying with it the imprimatur of
legislative approval, provides great encouragement to do so. Even if
the hard approach seems to the court the wiser alternative, it would
seem preferable to the current chaos. "A review of the cases suggests
a serious doubt whether this method of administration is a sufficient
safeguard for the stability of... transactions to meet the needs of the
business elements of the community 3 66 or the personal transactions
of the citizens of the state.

365. Posting of Gerald Cohen to American Dialect Society Mailing List,
http://listserv.linguistlist.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9908d&L=ads-l&D=1&H=1&F=
&S=&P=262 (Aug. 22, 1999, 22:28:58 EST); see also LOYAL JONES & BILLY EDD
WHEELER, LAUGHTER IN APPALACHIA:

A FESTIVAL OF SOUTHERN MOUNTAIN

HUMOR 26 (1986) (discussing children's misunderstanding of song lyrics).
366. These are the closing words in 1932 of James Chadbourn and Charles McCormick.
Chadbourn & McCormick, supra note 4, at 176.
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